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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I.

WEST VIRGINIA SUNSHINE ACT

In the recent decision of Appalachian Power Co. v. Public
Service Commission,1 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals substantially delineated and constricted the parameters of
the West Virginia Sunshine Act 2 by holding it inapplicable to
most of the functions of the Public Service Commission.3 This
case represents the first time the court has considered the scope
4
of the Act since it was enacted in 1975.
The controversy arose when Appalachian Power Company5
filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court of
Kanawha County seeking to have the Act applied to all of the
PSC's proceedings and, consequently, to have any actions of the
Commission taken in contravention of the Act's open meeting requirements rendered void.6 Upon a judgment entered in favor of
253 S.E.2d 377 (W. Va. 1979).
2 W. VA. CODE §§ 6-9A-1, -5 (1979 Replacement Vol. and Cum. Supp. 1979)

[hereinafter referred to as the Act].
' Hereinafter referred to as the PSC or the Commission.
4 Act of March 8, 1975, ch. 177, 1975 W.Va. Acts 590.
Hereinafter referred to as APCO.
6 253

S.E.2d at 379-80.
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APCO, the PSC appealed. The court examined the decisionmaking process of the Commission and found it to be divided into
three distinct segments.7 Analyzing each of these segments in
light of specific statutory definitions, only the first, the hearing
stage, was held to come within the ambit of the Sunshine Act,
and then only when two or more Commission members were
presiding."
Section 3 of the Act provides in broad terms that "[a]U meetings of any governing body shall be open to the public." The
court was confronted initially with determining which gatherings
of a governing segment of a public body amounted to a "meeting"
as defined in section 2(4) of the Act."' APCO urged the court to
adopt an expansive view of the term "meeting" and to construe it
to encompass "any coming together of a governing body whether
or not that assemblage is capable of legally transacting busness." 11 Rejecting this interpretation, the court instead narrowly
interpreted the term "meeting" as used in the Act to include only
"a convening of a governing body of a public body if the convening is for the purpose of making a decision or deliberating toward
or rule requires a quorum as a
a decision, and if some statute
'2
prerequisite t6 convening.
A hearing, the first stage of the Commission's decisionmaking
process, did not meet the demands of this standard, since a hearing of the PSC could be convened without a quorum. In addition,
since a hearing did not require the presence of any of the three
Commissioners, it could not be considered in every instance a
"convening" of the governing body.' 3 Based on these two factors,
the court found that most hearings of the PSC were not subject
Id. at 381.
8 Id. at 383.
7

9 W.VA.

Replacement Vol.).
as:
the convening of a governing body of a public body for which a quorum
is required in order to make a decision or to deliberate toward a decision
on any matter.
W.VA. CODE § 6-9A-2(4) (1979 Replacement Vol.).
11 253 S.E.2d at 382. This interpretation is based on a reading of the clause
"for which a quorum is required" as modifying "a public body," which immediately precedes it. See 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 230 at 414, 415.
CODE § 6-9A-3 (1979
10 Meeting is defined in part

12 253 S.E.2d at 381.

IsId. at 383.
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to the Act's proscriptions. In a notable exception, however, the
court did include within the definition of "meeting" those hearings of the PSC which were attended by two or more Commissioners. 1 Since the Commissioners' presence is not mandated by
a quorum requirement as a prerequisite to the convening of a
hearing, the court seems to have created an exception to its quorum requirement. In effect, this exception would seem to broaden
the scope of "meeting" to include any convening of a majority of
the members of a governing body whether a statute or rule requires a quorum or not.
The court did not apply this broad definition, however, to the
second phase of the decisionmaking process, which was described
as "the continuum of consultations, deliberations and the process
of making a decision."' After examining the informal nature of
these activities, the court concluded that "a quorum is not required at any stage of this continuum and ... no stage necessarily involves the convening of the governing body.116 Applying the
narrow definition used to exclude most hearings, the court found
that none of these activities amounted to a "meeting" and could
be conducted without the compliance with the formal requirements of the Sunshine Act. 17 The assemblage in which the Commissioners gather to render their final decision in a proceeding
marks the third and final stage of the decisionmaking process. Although this gathering properly constitutes a meeting under the
statute, it was viewed by the court as an adjudicatory decision in
a quasi-judicial proceeding 8 and, as such, was specifically excepted from the Sunshine Act.' 9 Pursuant to a procedural due

14

Id.

15 Id.
1

Id.

The court did not mention the possibility of two Commissioners deliberating together in this stage but, instead, emphasized the impracticality of subjecting
informal Commissioner-staff consultations to the Act. It thus remained silent on
the possible future application of its broader definition in circumstances where it
would not cause undue hardship to apply it. See notes 26, 27, infra.
17

18 253 S.E.2d at 385.

19 Even where a gathering of the public body's governing segment properly
constitutes a meeting, the meeting is excluded from the Act's coverage where the
meeting is "for the purpose of making an adjudicatory decision in any quasi-judicial, administrative or court of claims proceeding." W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-2(4)(a)
(1979 Replacement Vol.).
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process mandate, these hearings necessarily involve "notice, presentation of evidence, the making of a record, examination of witnesses under oath and the exercise of subpoena power."20 In the
court's assessment, these functions amount to a "judicial power
exercised by an official not within the judicial branch of government," and were labelled as "quasi-judicial. '21 The judgments arrived at in such proceedings, if final, the court concluded, are adjudicatory. This phase, consequently, is specifically exempted
22
from the act.
While the court liberally applied its definition of "meeting"
to hearings with two Commissioner's present, there is little indication that it will be similarly applied in the future. Given the
definition of "meeting" adopted in AppalachianPower, the Sunshine Act's open meeting requirements would be restricted severely. The policy underlying the Act, as clearly articulated in
its first provision, envisions a broader reading of the Act than the
narrow definition adopted by the court. The Declaration of Legislative Policy states that it is in "the best interest of the people of
this State for all proceedings of all public bodies to be conducted
in an open and public manner. '2 The court justifiably noted that
this broad declaration and the subsequent statutory sections
meant to enact the stated policy seem to have been written by
two different persons. 24 Yet, given the nature of the Act, there is
little reason for this dichotomy. As written, the Act contains sufficient exceptions to prevent its application in impracticaf or inappropriate instances. 25 To go further and constrict the Act's appli-

20
21
22
2

253 S.E.2d at 383-84.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 385.
W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-1 (1979 Replacement Vol.). The declaration states as

the reason for such a policy that "public agencies, boards, commissions, governing
bodies, councils and all other public bodies in this State exist for the singular
purpose of representing citizens of this State in governmental affairs ...."
24 253 S.E.2d at 385 n.6. Commenting on the Declaration, the court states

that "it is unfortunate that the actual words of the Act fail to properly implement
this lofty policy."
15"Meeting," as defined, does not include meetings wherein adjudicatory de-

cisions are made, on-site inspections of projects or programs, or political party
caucuses. W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-3 (1979 Replacement Vol.). In addition, the Act
allows a governing body to go into executive session when exceptional circumstances would merit non-disclosure of the information discussed. Some of these
instances include discussion of personnel matters, consideration of a complaint
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cability to only those situations where the governing segment of a
public body convenes under a quorum requirement to reach or
deliberate toward a decision limits the scope of the Act to an

impalatable degree. If the Legislature does not amend the Act to
broaden the definition of "meeting," then the court should recognize that the Act, as a statute enacted in the public interest
(which the Act itself expressly declares) should be construed liberally in favor of its intended effect.2 6 While the unique circumstances existing in this case perhaps warranted the particular result,27 future decisions should be guided to a greater degree by
the nature of the governmental entity involved, by the subject
matter of the proceedings being conducted and by the salutary
public policy which initially inspired the Act's adoption.

II. DuE PROCESS
A series of cases recently decided by the West Virginia
court has dealt with the sufficiency of proceedings under
due process considerations where the dismissal or transferral of

filed against a public officer or employee, consideration of disciplinary measures to
be taken against a student, review of the denial, suspension or revocation of a
license, or the discussion of matters harmful to a person's reputation. The affected
party, however, may request that the meeting be opened. W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-4.
26 To properly implement the spirit of the Sunshine Act, unless specifically
excepted, whenever a governing segment of a public body gathers to conduct business, it should hold the meeting open to the public. Additionally, "governing
body" should be interpreted as any decisionmaking group within a public body,
whether or not it is formally recognized as the official governing body. In the instant case, while the staff members meeting to conduct a hearing are not recognized as the official governing body of the Public Service Commission, the information gathered and discussed by them may in fact constitute a large part of the
decisionmaking process. In this regard they may be considered a de facto governing body and, thus, be subjected to the Act's requirements. But see note 27,
infra.
'7 In a similar case decided recently in Florida, under a very broad Sunshine
Act which holds even quasi-judicial proceedings subject to the Act, the Florida
court found that "nothing in the Sunshine Law requires each Commissioner to do
his or her thinking in public" and that the members of a collegial administrative
body are not required to avoid their staff during the evaluation and consideration
stages of their deliberation. The practical effect of such an application, the court
concluded, would lead to a situation where "the value of staff expertise would be
lost and the intelligent use of employees would be crippled." Occidental Chemical
Co. v. Mayo, 351 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1977) (construing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011
(Cum. Supp. 1979)).
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state school personnel was involved.28 In each case, the proceedings were found to be inadequate by due process standards.
In Trimboli v. Board of Education29 the court reinforced the
rule established in an earlier opinion that an administrative body
may not depart from the rules and regulations it has promulgated
for its operation." Trimboli, in 1961, was hired by the Wayne
County Board of Education as a teacher. In 1972, he became Di-rector of Federal Programs in the school system's central office.
Upon recommendation of the County Superintendent, and after a
subsequent hearing and affirmation by the county school board,
he was reassigned to teacher status.31
A rule that had been previously promulgated by the West
Virgnia State Board of Education provided that "every employee
is entitled to know how well he is performing his job, and should
be offered the opportunity of open and honest evaluation of his
performance on a regular basis."3 2 The court construed this order
liberally in favor of school employees, finding that the word
"should" was, in fact, a mandatory requirement.3 After this determination, the focus of the opinion shifted to the scope of the
rule's applicability. A statutory enactment in 1949 provided that
each county board of education could hire special supervisors and
directors, whose "period of employment shall be at the discretion
of the board."'1 Even in light of this section, however, the court
interpreted "every" as contained in the West Virginia Board of
Education's evaluation rule as unequivocally applying to all
school board employees regardless of the statutory nature of their
position.3 5 In reaching this conclusion, the majority opinion emphasized that it will adhere to the general principal stated in the
28 One of these cases. State ex rel. McLendon v. Morton, 249 S.E.2d 919 (W.
Va. 1978), is discussed in the CONSTITUTIONAL LAW section of this survey.
29 254 S.E.2d 561 (W. Va. 1979).
'o The court cited its earlier decision in Powell v. Brown, 238 S.E.2d 220 (W.
Va. 1977) for this proposition. 254 S.E.2d at 565.
31 254 S.E.2d at 562.
22 W. Va. Bd. of Ed. Policy No. 5300 (6)(a).
254 S.E.2d at 566.
3, Id. at 564, quoting W. VA. CODE § 18-5-32 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
35 Although it was recognized that incompetency was harder to prove in the
case of an administrator who holds a special trust relationship with his superior,
the court in its decision was persuaded by the fact that the order itself made no
distinction between teachers and administrators. 254 S.E.2d at 566-67.
3
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earlier decision of Powell v. Brown,36 that "an administrative
board must abide by its rules. '31 Consequently, any action by a
school board discharging, demoting or transferring an employee
in derogation of an existing regulation's due process procedures,
when correctable conduct is involved, is prohibited.3 s
In another case involving the job status of school teachers,
the West Virginia court reiterated its commitment to construing
school personnel laws and regulations so as to promote teachers'
job security. In Morgan v. Pizzino" a group of teachers had their
names placed on a transfer and reassignment list by the county
board of education at the recommendation of the county school
superintendent. 40 They were later notified of this action and given
the opportunity to appear before the board. They refused this invitation. Instead, they sought a writ of mandamus in the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to force the school board and
the county superintendent to place their names on the regularly
employed personnel list or remove their names from the transfer
41
and reassignment list.
Under section 7, article 2, chapter 18A of the West Virginia
Code, a school board must give a teacher .notice and a hearing
before placing his or her name on such a list.42 The court took
note of this requirement and dismissed the county school board's
attempt in the instant case to give subsequent notice and a hearing as contrary to the purpose of the statute's requirement, thus
strictly construing the due process provisions of the regulations
and statutes in favor of the teachers.' 3 Significantly, however, the
opinion noted that ordinarily in the future the court would not
accept petitions alleging procedural irregularities until all admin-

36 238 S.E.2d 220 (W. Va. 1977).
37 254 S.E.2d at 562.

38 Id. at 567-68.
39 256 S.E.2d 592 (W. Va.1979).
40 Id.
41 Id.

at 593.

41 W. VA. CODE § 18A-2-7 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
41 In so construing the statute, the court noted that "[t]he purpose of Code §
18A-2-7 notice and hearing is to give employees an opportunity to present their
position to the Board before their names are listed. If a decison has already been
made, and the employees have bee pre-judged, the process is meaningless." 256
S.E.2d at 595.
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istrative and circuit court remedies had been exhaustedY'
The court markedly retreated from this line of strict adherence to procedural due process in a case involving the dismissal of
a State Penitentiary Correctional Officer. In Bone v. Department
of Corrections,45 Bone was dismissed without notice from his position as a correctional officer. Three days later he received a letter outlining the reasons for his dismissal and offering him an opportunity to respond personally or in writing to his deputy. 40
Following the proper administrative procedures, Bone chose to
appeal his firing to the Civil Service Commission. Upon a ruling
upholding the dismissal, he then appealed to the West Virginia
47
Supreme Court.
Section 10(11), article 6, chapter 29 of the West Virginia
Code states that discharge of employees in classified service "shall
take place only after the person has been presented with the reasons for such discharge . . . in writing, and has been allowed a
reasonable time to reply thereto in writing, or upon request...
to appear personally and reply. . .. ,,48 In the face of this statutory mandate, the Civil Service Commission promulgated a regulation which provided that in cases where gross misconduct had
been alleged the decision to give notice could be dispensed with
at the discretion of the "Appointing Authority. ' 49
Justice Caplan, speaking for the majority, acknowledged the
requirements of the statute but felt that there had been "substantial compliance" with its terms, even though the letter containing
the reasons for the dismissal and the invitation to respond had
been mailed three days after Bone's discharge.50 Justice McGraw,
however, in his dissent, argued that the statutory provision "unequivocally precludes summary judgment such as here occurred. . . ."51 This line of reasoning is similar to the general
principle advanced by the majority in the teacher due process

44 256 S.E.2d at 595.
45 255 S.E.2d 919 (W. Va. 1979).
46 Id. at 920.
4 Id.
"8 W. VA. CODE

§ 29-6-10(11) (Cum. Supp. 1979).

4' Civil Service Comm'n Reg., art. 11, section 10.
50 255 S.E.2d at 922-23.
1' Id. at 923 (McGraw, J., dissenting).
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cases.5 2 McGraw noted that a refusal to strictly enforce the statutory due process provisions in an administrative proceeding "seriously weakens the protection afforded State employees by the
Civil Service Law.""3 As McGraw also notes, by upholding the
propriety of the Commission's regulation promulgated in derogation of a specific statutory mandate, the majority seems to be approving such ultra vires rulemaking and "encouraging other agencies to ignore the clear dictates of the Civil Service Law."
HI.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

The question of when a direct route to the Supreme Court of
Appeals may be taken prior to the exhaustion of available administrative remedies was considered in Walls v. Miller.5 5 The decision of the court substantially restated the rule that when resort
to administrative remedies would amount to a futile or unwarranted time-delaying process, a direct writ of mandamus in the
Supreme Court of Appeals will lie.56
The case involved an allegation by Walls, a United Mine
Worker's Local President, that the Director of the Department of
Mines had failed to enforce certain statutory mine safety provsions. 57 Justice Neely, in the majority opinion, noted that Wall's
challenge to the Director's policy was not limited to a single isolated instance of non-enforcement but was a challenge to the Director's "philosophy of enforcement" and to the Director's construction of the "requirements, purposes, and legislative intent of
the three code sections under review.15 8 According to the court,
these legal issues did not properly depend for their resolution on
"the detailed factual development which the administrative process envisages.

52

' 59

It was also noted that, although Walls could

In each of the teacher due process cases, statutes and regulations were

strictly construed in favor of the employee. In Morgan v. Pizzino, 256 S.E.2d 592
(W. Va. 1979) the majority made note of the fact that notice and an opportunity
for a hearing after a decision has been made are meaningless. See note 43, supra.
53

255 S.E.2d at 923.
Id. at 923-24.

251 S.E.2d 491 (W. Va. 1979).
See: State ex rel. Kanawha Co. Board of Education v. Dyer, 154 W.Va. 840,
179 S.E.2d 577 (1971).
:7 251 S.E.2d at 494.
8 Id. at 495.
"

56

59 Id.
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have resorted to other legal or administrative remedies without a
definitive resolution of the issues by the Supreme Court of Appeals, the deprivation of rights which Walls suffered would probably reoccur in many situations. 0 These circumstances, the court
concluded, were sufficient to justify the bypass of administrative
remedies in favor
of a direct writ of mandamus in the state's
1
highest court.6

Barry G. McOwen

ATTORNEY-CLIENT
I.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The Supreme Court of Appeals addressed the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in several 1979 decisions. Although
the court did not substantially alter its position, it did refine the
principles set forth in earlier opinions on this subject. The recent
cases afford an opportunity to observe how the court will apply
the previously announced tests for ineffective assistance of counsel to certain factual situations.
State v. Bush"2 concerned the appeal of a defendant convicted in the Circuit Court of Marion County of forcible rape.
Bush contended on appeal that the trial court had committed error in denying his motion for a continuance, and,.therefore, had
denied him effective assistance of counsel.
Bush was arrested and charged by warrant with forcible rape
on February 12, 1975. He contacted attorney Brent Beveridge
with regard to obtaining assistance in having bond set. Despite
Beveridge's efforts, no bond was ever obtained and Bush remained in the Marion County Jail pending trial. Beveridge represented Bush at the preliminary hearing conducted on February
18, 1975, at which Bush was bound over to the March term of the
grand jury. Beveridge had attended the hearing on the request of
Franklin Cleckley, Bush's attorney on previous occasions.
60 Id.

61Id. at 495-96.
62 255 S.E.2d 539 (W. Va. 1979).
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Subsequent to the preliminary hearing Beveridge discussed
in some detail with Bush and his wife the necessity for making
financial arrangements if his representation was to continue. Although discussions were also had concerning the employment of
Cleckley and Beveridge, no agreement was reached. Beveridge
had very little contact with Bush after these discussions. He filed
no motions on the defendant's behalf and did not attend the
hearing at which the trial docket was set. Cleckley had even less
pretrial involvement in the case.
Cleckley was notified by letter from the prosecuting attorney
that Bush's trial was set for April 18, 1975. Cleckley immediately
informed the prosecutor that he was not representing Bush in the
matter. A request was made that the court resolve the matter of
counsel. On April 25, 1975, a Friday, Cleckley was attending a
hearing at the Marion County Courthouse on another matter.
While Cleckley was at the Courthouse, the judge inquired of Bush
what arrangements he had made for counsel. Bush indicated that
he desired to employ Cleckley and would inform the court Monday, April 28, whether he could raise the necessary funds. The
court agreed to this procedure and continued the case until the
next term of court. However, approximately one hour later,
Cleckley received a handwritten note from the court which stated
that a conversation with the prosecuting attorney had revealed
that Beveridge had represented Bush after his arrest and, therefore, that the case would be tried on Monday, April 28.
The morning of the trial found Cleckley and Beveridge present, but not prepared to conduct Bush's defense. A motion was
made that the trial be continued for a period of time adequate for
counsel to prepare. The motion was denied and the trial proceeded, with Bush being convicted of forcible rape.6 On appeal,
the court noted that only one prior case, State ex rel. West Virginia-PittsburghCoal Co. v. Eno,64 had addressed the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel resulting from inadequate preparation time. Eno held that "[tihe right of a defendant in a criminal
case to be represented by counsel includes the right to effective
assistance of counsel, and the refusal to allow counsel sufficient

13Id. at 541-42.
135 W. Va. 473, 63 S.E.2d 845 (1951).
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time to prepare for trial is a denial of that right. 8' 5 In Eno, counsel had been allowed less than twenty-four hours to prepare.
The court observed that "[f]or several reasons, some based
on recent developments, the most important factor in considering
claims of the sort advanced here is the length of time between the
employment or appointment of counsel and the trial of the
case."86 Factors noted were the increased complexity of criminal
defense work and the increased burden placed upon lawyers by
the holding in State v. Thomas,17 specifically, that the attorney
must do more than simply insure that the trial is not a farce. He
must "exhibit the normal and customary degree of skill possessed
by attorneys who are reasonably knowledgeable of criminal
law." 6 Thus, defense counsel has a "constitutionally assigned role
of seeing to it that available defenses are raised and the prosecution is put to its proof.''86 To meet this duty, timely appointment
and a reasonable opportunity for adequate preparation are "absolute prerequisites. 7 0 The court concluded that the Eno principles
controlled and that Bush had been denied effective assistance of
counsel by the trial court's refusal to allow for more than one
weekend in which to prepare for Bush's defense. It was further
noted that the defendant, by his own actions, can deny himself
effective assistance of counsel and will be unable to assert that
defense if it is found that he has intentionally procrastinated in
the employment of counsel. A strategy of delay was not noted on
7
the part of Bush. 1
Although Eno was found to be controlling, the court noted
that Bush's conviction could have been overturned by applying
the conventional standard of appellate review to the denial of a
continuance by the trial court. It was observed that:
The granting of a continuance is a matter within the
sound discretion of the trial court ... and the refusal thereof
is not ground for reversal unless it is made to appear that the
court abused its discretion, and that its refusal has worked in-

05

Id. at 482, 63 S.E.2d at 850.

66 255 S.E.2d at 542.
67 203 S.E.2d 445 (W.
68 255 S.E.2d at 543.

Va. 1974).

15 Id.
70

Id.

71

Id. at 544.
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jury and prejudice to 7the
rights of the party in whose behalf
2
the motion was made.
Unable to find any justification for the refusal to grant the continuance coupled with the inability of the defendant's attorneys
to prepare, the court concluded that the trial court had abused its
discretion and that Bush had, been prejudiced because of the
3
abuse.7
State v. Bush clearly shows that trial courts have a role in
the providing of effective assistance of counsel to criminal defendants. The defense counsel must meet the standards of competence set forth in Thomas, but the trial court must take steps to
insure that counsel is designated with sufficient timeliness to allow for adequate preparation. The court must assist the lawyer in
meeting his constitutional duty.
In Burton v. Whyte,7 4 the court was confronted with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought by a defendant convicted
of grand larceny. The basis of the petition was that Burton's defense counsel had been incompetent and that, therefore, he had
been denied effective assistance of counsel.
Burton and his brother were arrested for stealing a cash register. While at the police station, Burton was seen by the municipal police court judge, a personal acquaintance of Burton who
had arranged for him to surrender several months prior on a
charge of breaking and entering. Burton conferred with the judge
at the station and expressed concern that the larceny charge
would affect his chances of obtaining probation on the breaking
and entering charge. The judge advised Burton that if he held
any hope at all for probation on the prior charge he should fully
cooperate with the authorities on the larceny charge. Burton
pondered the matter for two days and informed the police that he
would take them to the location of the stolen cash register. During the trip to the site he was informed of his Mirandarights for
the second time since his arrest. He furnished a written
confession.
A pretrial motion was entered to suppress the confession. It
72
72
74

Id., quoting Syllabus pt. 1, State v. Jones, 84 W. Va. 85, 99 S.E. 271 (1919).
Id. at 546.
256 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1979).
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was contended that the confession was invalid because the police
judge was an officer of the court and the confession made pursuant to his advice was not voluntary. The motion was denied and
Burton's counsel advised him to enter a guilty plea, which was
done. Burton's contention on appeal was that his counsel had
been incompetent because he should have recognized that the
confession was invalid as a matter of law. Burton also assigned a
second basis for belief that the confession was invalid, this being
that it had been rendered without prior consultation with
75
counsel.

In discussing the issues raised by Burton, the Supreme Court
of Appeals noted the test of incompetent advice set forth in State
76

v. Sims:

Before a guilty plea will be set aside based on the fdct that
the defendant was incompetently advised, it must be shown
that (1) counsel did act incompetently; (2) the incompetency
must relate to a matter which would have substantially affected the fact finding process if the case had proceeded to
trial; 7(3) the guilty plea must have been motivated by this
7
error.
The court discussed at some length the existing law on the validity of confessions. It was concluded that while there was some
doubt, in all likelihood the confession was valid. This determination was fatal to Burton's petition as it prevented him from even
meeting the first part of the Sims test. "[B]efore an initial finding
will be made pursuant to the first step of the Sims analysis that
'counsel did act incompetently' (citation omitted) . . . the advice

must be manifestly erroneous."7 8 The defendant had failed to
show that the confession was so unquestionably invalid as to
make his lawyer's advice incompetent. To further Burton's plight,
it was noted that even if the confession were invalid, the second
part of the Sims test would not have been met because the prosecution had sufficient evidence to warrant conviction without the
confession or anything obtained as a result of it. 9 The petition
for writ of habeas corpus was denied.
7

Id. at 425-26.

248 S.E.2d 834 (W. Va. 1978).
256 S.E.2d at 426, quoting Syllabus pt. 3, State v. Sims, 248 S.E.2d 834 (W.
Va. 1978).
76
77

78
70

Id. at 427-28.
Id. at 428.
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Burton demonstrates the difficulty which will be encountered
by a defendant attempting to show the incompetence of his defense counsel. The court noted that "clear proof of incompetency" would be required before it accepted the assertion that a
guilty plea resulted from incompetent advice of counsel.80
State v. Pelfreys1 concerned an appeal from a conviction for
malicious assault. The defendant made three assignments of error,8 2 in none of which was it contended that he was denied effec-

tive assistance of counsel. The court indicated that the errors assigned were of little merit, then noted two quotes from the trial
court record which indicated that the appointed defense attorney
was aware of errors in the trial but had not sought a new trial due
to personal economic considerations and that the trial judge
would have granted a mistrial had defense counsel made that
motion.

83

The court noted that "[e]rrors of counsel are not deemed to
be ineffective assistance if those errors are arguably a matter of
trial tactics or strategy."'" However, there was no consideration of
trial tactics in this case. The decision not to seek a new trial was
based upon personal financial considerations. These considerations, the court held, had diluted the lawyer's loyalty to his client,
and placed him in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In conclusion, the court stated:
When in a criminal case, defense counsel, reinforced by
the court, maintains a reasonable, good faith belief that error
has occurred warranting mistrial, but fails to move for mistrial
solely because of personal economic motivation, 85the defendant
has been denied effective assistance of counsel.
Pelfrey stands for the obvious proposition that an appointed
attorney commits reversible error when he does not pursue certain legal remedies because of the low rate of pay for court-apsoId. at 429.
81

256 S.E.2d 438 (W. Va. 1979).

The errors assigned were the denial of his right to a speedy trial, prejudice
caused by admission of evidence of prior crimes, and prejudice caused by the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's misconduct. Id. at 439.
:3 256 S.E.2d at 439.
82

4

Id. at 440.

86 Id.
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pointed attorneys.
II.

JUDICIAL ETHICS

In West Virginia Judicial Commission v. Allamong,88 the
question was discussed of whether and to what extent a magistrate who is a licensed attorney may engage in the practice of law.
The case concerned Elden Allamong, magistrate of Mineral
County, against whom a complaint had been filed with the Inquiry Commission that he was practicing law, in violation of Canon 5(F) of the Judicial Code of Ethics.
In discussing the question, the court noted that a conflict existed between the Canon, which prohibits the practice of law by a
magistrate, and the West Virginia Constitution which allows a
magistrate to "practice law except to the extent prohibited by the
legislature. ' 87 It was contended that the legislature had restricted
the practice of law by attorney magistrates with W. Va. Code section 50-1-4, which provides that a magistrate serving more than
5,000 people, as did Allamong, was to devote "full time to his
public duties."88 The court rejected this contention, noting that
the Code discusses in section 50-1-12(d) limits placed upon the
activities of magistrates, the restrictions consisting in relevant
part of a prohibition against engaging in any "remunerative endeavor while on the premises of the magistrate court office." 89 It
was noted as well that "full time" is an ambiguous term, and
there were, therefore, insufficient grounds to conclude that the
legislature had intended to prohibit the practice of law by magistrates who were so qualified, so long as they did so away from the
magistrate office. The court also refused to accept the suggestion
that W. Va. Code section 5(J-1-12, which requires that magistrates
"abide by the code of judicial ethics," 90 incorporated by reference
the prohibition in the Code of Judicial Ethics. The court noted
that the Code could never be taken to override a constitutional
provision. 91 The court concluded that Allamong was to be allowed
to practice law in his spare time away from the magistrate office.
86 252 S.E.2d 159 (W. Va. 1979).
W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, §7.

W. VA. CODE § 50-1-4 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
89 Id. § 50-1-12(d) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
90 Id. § 50-1-12 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
91 252 S.E.2d at 163-64.
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Apparently, absent a clear directive from the legislature, the
court will be unwilling to prevent magistrates from engaging in
the practice of law when they are qualified to do so. The only
restriction is that they cannot allow their law practice to interfere
with the performance of their magisterial duties. The court reiterthe Canons of the Judiated that magistrates are subject to all of
92
cial Code of Ethics except Canon 5(F).
III.

SPECIAL PROSECUTORS

The Supreme Court of Appeals provided guidance with regard to appointment and payment of special prosecutors in State
ex rel Johnson v. Robinson.9 3 The case arose when all members of
the Cabell County prosecutor's office were disqualified from a
murder case. Two special prosecutors were appointed, who tried
the case and obtained a conviction. At the close of the trial the
special prosecutors made a motion to the trial court that
$7,212.97 represented a reasonable fee for their services and that
they should be paid that amount. The court entered orders
awarding fees in the amount stated and directed the circuit clerk
to certify the amount to the county commission for payment. The
commission reviewed the order in July of 1978. By September,
payment had not been made. The commissioners were ordered to
show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court."
The commissioners noted that W. Va. Code section 7-7-8 provided that the circuit court was to certify to the county commission the performance of services as special prosecutor and recommend the payment of a reasonable fee. The county commission
was to determine whether the fee was reasonable and, if so, pay
it. 5 In this case, it had been determined by the commission that

02

Id. at 164.

93 251 S.E.2d 505 (W. Va. 1979).
9, Id. at 506-07.
95 W. VA. CODE § 7-7-8 (Cur. Supp. 1979) provides in pertinent part:
If, in any case, the prosecuting attorney and his assistants are unable to
act, or if in the opinion of the court it would be improper for him or his
assistants to act, the court shall appoint some competent practicing attorney to act in that case. The court shall certify to the county court the
performance of that service when completed and recommend to the
county court a reasonable compensation for the attorney for his service,
and the compensation, when allowed by the county court, shall be paid
out of the county treasury.
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the fee was not reasonable. The commissioners contended that it
was within their discretion to make that determination. The circuit judge disagreed. The commissioners sought a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the order of the circuit court
awarding the fees. 8
The Supreme Court of Appeals agreed with the commissioners. The court looked to the statutory language and concluded
that the determination of whether the fee paid a special prosecutor was reasonable was within the discretion of the county
commission.9
The commissioners also contended that the Code allowed the
appointment of one special prosecutor, not two or more, noting
that the statute called for the designation of "some competent
98
... attorney." The court declined to accept this contention. It
was noted that "[w]ithout doubt there are complex cases that demand more than one prosecutor. If the circuit court ... determines that the complexity of the case requires multiple prosecutors, such discretion, if exercised with reasonable limits is not to
be interfered with."99
Robinson points out the problem common to all court-appointed attorneys: payment. The system for payment of special
prosecutors is cumbersome and allows for dramatic underpayment. It would seem that a system whereby the State paid special
prosecutors would be preferable. The benefit would result from
the, hopefully, less tenuous nature of State finances as compared
with those of the counties. A fixed fee schedule as is utilized for
defense counsel would allow for greater fairness to all attorneys
who undertake this particular service.
Larry 0. Ford

256 S.E.2d at 506.
Id. at 508.
"Id.
Id. at 508-09.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. FiFTH AMENDMENT AND DuE PROCESS

During the past year, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals decided a series of cases involving Fifth Amendment and
due process claims. In State v. Burton,10 0 the court addressed two
significant constitutional issues. First, it adopted a liberal inter11
pretation of the scope of the Fifth Amendment, holding the
10 2
"disclosures"'
to
extended
privilege against self-incrimination
that might furnish a link in a chain of evidence or lead to evidence which could be used in a criminal prosecution. 103 The court
also held that the state need only prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence.' 0
Thomas R. Burton was convicted of rape in the Circuit Court
of Taylor County under a prior statute, W. Va. Code section 61-215. The defendant appealed the conviction on several grounds'0 5
but particularly assigned as constitutional errors the fact that the
trial court had permitted a State's witness to invoke the Fifth
Amendment privilege as to a prior criminal conviction and an alleged failure on the part of the State to prove the venue of the
crime. (The specific details of the crime are not particularly relevant to the constitutional issues raised.) The defendant, Burton,
and another man, Jones, were arrested and charged with the rape
100254 S.E.2d 129 (W. Va. 1979).
101 In State v. Boyd, 233 S.E.2d 710, 714 (W. Va. 1977), the West Virginia
court clearly indicated that art. III, § 5 of the West Virginia Constitution provided

at least co-equal coverage in regard to the privilege against self-incrimination.
Thus, while in State v. Burton the parties only assert the protection of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the same principles would apply
under art. III, § 5 of the West Virginia Constitution. The court stated that this
was in accordance with the general law of the land, citing 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses § 31. 254 S.E.2d at 137.
202This extension of Fifth Amendment protection is to be juxtaposed with
those "disclosures" which, if answered, would in themselves support a conviction
of the witness.
103 See also: Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
The State has the burden of proving the venue, that is, that the crime
'0
occurred in the county where the defendant is tried, by virtue of art. III, § 14 of
the West Virginia Constitution. See also: State v. Tapp, 153 W. Va. 759, 172
S.E.2d 583 (1970).
105254 S.E.2d at 132.
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of a waitress during the commission of a robbery at a tavern in
Taylor County. During the course of the defendant's trial on
these charges, the State produced Roy Myers as a witness. Myers
had been in the Taylor County jail with the defendant and testified that during the course of a conversation, Burton admitted his
involvement in a robbery at the tavern and that he had engaged
in sexual relations with a waitress at the bar who had been bound
with ropes during the robbery.
The defendant urged that reversible error was committed
when the court permitted the State's witness, Myers, to invoke
the Fifth Amendment. Myers invoked the Fifth Amendment initially when he was asked on cross-examination why he was in the
Taylor County jail. Additionally, Myers invoked the Fifth
Amendment on questions relating to whether he had been convicted of a felony in Maine, had been placed on parole, and had
violated the parole terms which brought about extradition proceedings in Taylor County. Counsel for the defendant, Burton, argued that the witness Myers' prior felony conviction would not be
incriminatory to Myers in any extradition hearing or subsequent
parole revocation hearing Myers might face in Maine. Therefore,
the defense counsel wanted the trial court to use its discretion
and allow the defense to impeach Myers' credibility by a prior
criminal conviction. 00 The West Virginia court disagreed with the
contentions of defense counsel, stating that, historically, the Fifth
Amendment had been extended to answers that would expose a
witness not only to criminal prosecution but also to forfeitures
and penalties.207 The court had no doubt that an extradition proceeding carried with it a sufficient penalty to cause evidence bearing on issues arising at such a hearing to come within the purview
of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The defendant's second constitutional assignment of error
claimed that the State failed to prove the venue of the crime as
required by article I, section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution. In general, there are two lines of authority regarding the
106This matter might have been resolved by concluding that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion. However, the record indicated that the issue was handled on the basis of the Fifth Amendment.
107 See United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715

(1971).
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question of whether the State must prove venue beyond all reasonable doubt or whether it is sufficient to prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence. 108 The West Virginia court held that
the better-reasoned approach recognized that venue is not a fact
which relates to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Therefore,
venue is not a substantive element of a crime and need only be
proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
In Burton, there was no dispute that the rape occurred at the
bar known as the End of the Bridge, and that the End of the
Bridge was in Grafton. The court then took judicial notice of the
fact that Grafton was the county seat of Taylor County. The
court did state that they were not removing proof of venue in a
criminal case but only determining the amount of proof required.
It was clear to the court that prior West Virginia cases had been
liberal in weighing the State's proof of venue. In Burton, this liberal gloss was extended.
The West Virginia court addressed the constitutional issues
of the defendant's right to be present in misdemeanor cases and
the propriety of an increased sentence imposed at a trial de novo
or upon remand in State v. Eden. 0 9 In Eden, the defendant was
found guilty in Justice of the Peace court of the misdemeanor of
reckless driving and was fined fifty dollars. The defendant appealed the decision and at the trial de novo in circuit court, the
defendant was found guilty of the same offense, was sentenced to
thirty days in jail, and was fined three hundred dollars. The defendant failed to appear in person at the trial in circuit court be-cause his attorney failed to notify him of the trial date.
On appeal the court remanded the case for a new trial and
held that imposition of an increased sentence at a trial de novo or
upon reconviction in trial court after remand from an appellate
108 Courts which require proof of venue beyond a reasonable doubt focus on
the fact that venue is a necessary jurisdictional element to sustain a criminal conviction. See, e.g., State v. Evely, 228 N.W.2d 196 (Iowa 1975). Courts holding that
a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient take the view that venue has no bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused as far as commission of the crime is
concerned. See, e.g., United States v. Luton, 486 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974).
109 256 S.E.2d 868 (W. Va. 1979).
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court violates due process. 110 The court thus extended its rule to
prohibit the imposition of an increased sentence upon reconviction where the case had been remanded from an appellate court,
even though that issue was not directly before the court in the
particular case. The court held the original sentence was the ceiling above which no additional penalty could be allowed.1 22 The
court rejected the argument that the defendant consents to a possible increase in punishment by his appeal. The court held that
conditioning the defendant's right to appeal on the notion that he
has consented to a possible increase in sentence by exercising his
rights violates due process. 1 2 Further, increased sentencing would
place an impermissible burden on appeal, since increased sentencing could be used vindictively to punish defendants who appeal.1 2 The court thus overruled the holdings in State ex rel.
Boner v. Boles21 4 and State ex rel. Bradley v. Johnson1 5 that
when a sentence is held to be void and a subsequent valid sentence is imposed, the valid sentence may provide greater punishment than that provided by the void sentence.
The second issue before the court in Eden involved the right
of a defendant in a misdemeanor case to be present at trial. The
court held that the defendant's right to be present at trial in a
misdemeanor case is a fundamental constitutional right implicit
in the right to confront one's accusers.1 1 6 The court held that the
defendant's right to be present should be no different for a misdemeanor than for a felony trial and since the same liberty and
property interests are at stake in both, due process dictates that

120 Id. at 876. W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 10, provides that, "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, and the judgment
of his peers."
11 256 S.E.2d 868, 876 (W. Va. 1979).

112

Id. at 873-74.

113 Id. The court relied heavily on Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636
(4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968), which placed a blanket prohibition on increased sentencing on reconviction in trial court after remand from an
appellate court. The court also discussed North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711
(1969), in which the United States Supreme Court, while refusing to impose an
absolute prohibition on increased sentencing, did discuss many of the same concerns about increased sentencing expressed in Patton.
114 148 W. VA. 802, 137 S.E.2d 418 (1964).
115 152 W. Va. 655, 166 S.E.2d 137 (1969).
116 256 S.E.2d at 871. The right to confront one's accusers is guaranteed by
U.S. CONST. amend. VI and W. VA. CONsT. art. III, § 14.
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the right to be present at trial exists in both instances. 117 In so
holding, the court rejected the previous West Virginia rule contained in syllabus point four of State v. Campbell1 8 that a misdemeanor trial may proceed in the absence of the defendant.
The court considered the issue of waiver of Fifth Amendment
rights by entry of a guilty plea in State v. Grimmer.119 In that
case, Grimmer and a co-defendant had been charged in the same
indictment. Prior to Grimmer's trial, the co-defendant entered a
plea of guilty but then indicated his intention to appeal his conviction. At Grimmer's trial, Grimmer called the co-defendant to
the stand. The co-defendant refused to testify, asserting the privilege against self-incrimination.1

20

Grimmer, on appeal of his con-

viction, argued that the co-defendant's failure to testify deprived
have compulsory process
Grimmer of his constitutional right 2to
1
for obtaining witnesses in his favor.

The West Virginia court affirmed Grimmer's conviction,
holding that even though one .charged in the same indictment as
the defendant has entered a guilty plea, he may assert his Fifth
Amendment right not to testify at the defendant's trial if he has
expressed to the court his intention to appeal his conviction entered on his guilty plea.1 22 The co-defendant's decision to appeal
allowed him to once again assert the constitutional rights which
he had waived by his guilty plea. 23 Thus, the co-defendants could
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination at Grimmer's trial
because any statement made by the co-defendant at that trial
could be used against him at a new trial if one were afforded him

117 Id. at 872. The right of a defendant in a felony case to be personally present at trial is explicitly provided for by W. VA. CODE § 62-3-2 (1977 Replacement

Vol.).
11s 42 W. Va. 246, 24 S.E. 875 (1896).

251 S.E.2d 780 (W. Va. 1979). The arraignment aspect of this case is discussed in the CRIMINAL LAW section of this survey.
126 U.S. CONST. amend. V; W. VA. CONST. art. lI, § 5.
119

121 U.S. CONST. amend. V; W. VA. CONST. art. H, § 14.
222 251

S.E.2d 780, 786 (W. Va. 1979).

13Id.
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4

II. EQUAL

PROTECTION AND

DUE

PROCESS IN EDUCATION

The constitutional considerations discussed by the court in
Pauley v. Kelley'2 5 could have serious ramifications for the
financing of secondary education in West Virginia. Although the
court remanded the case for further factual development, it did
establish certain guidelines for determining whether the state
school financing system violated equal protection provisions.
These guidelines could have a substantial impact on the outcome
of the case on remand.
In Pauley, the plaintiffs, parents of five children attending
public schools in Lincoln County, brought an action on behalf of
themselves and as a class claiming that the system for financing
public schools violated the West Virginia Constitution.126 The
plaintiffs claimed that their children were denied a "thorough and
efficient" education and equal protection 27 of the law. The complaint was particularly directed at the inequalities that existed in
the state secondary education system created by markedly out-ofbalance annual funding, which produced inadequate facilities,
curriculum deficiencies, and a shortage of personnel in the schools
of the property-poor counties, such as Lincoln, compared with
those in the more wealthy counties of the state.
It is essential to note the procedural particularities of the
case. The case was decided at the trial court level solely on the
pleadings and admissions of the parties and the statistical materials available from public documents. No testimony was offered.
The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and the defendants
moved to dismiss because the complaint failed to state a cause of
action. The court then made factual findings to the effect that the
Lincoln County school system was inadequate in comparison
with four other counties. 28 The trial court also decided that even

124

Id.

1225255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
11

West Virginia Constitution

art. XII,

§ 1 mandates

the State to

provide "a thorough and efficient system of schools" for the children of the State.
27 The West Virginia Constitution also mandates by virtue of art. III, §
10 that: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law..."
MsThose counties were Kanawha, Marshall, Brooke and Hancock. The
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though the system of public schools in Lincoln County was not
adequate there was no evidence presented that the public school
children residing in property-poor counties were necessarily
poorer than those children who resided in counties with a higher
overall property value. Therefore, equal protection guarantees
were inapplicable as to the nature of the classification as it did
not fall into that category 9of classifications which were automati12
cally considered suspect.
The defendant's motion to dismiss was granted because the
plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the poor school system in
Lincoln County was a product of the then existing school financing system. This, according to the Supreme Court, was sufficient
reason for not granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment but it did not justify a granting of the defendant's motion
to dismiss. A motion to dismiss is designed simply to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint.1 30 Because the trial court recognized that the plaintiff had asserted valid constitutional challenges to the existing school financing system, a motion to dismiss
was improper and the case was remanded to the trial court for
further evidentiary development. Since there were significant and
far-reaching public issues involved, the West Virginia court found
it advisable to propose constitutional guidelines that the trial
court should follow in the remanded case.
The court held that the lower court correctly recognized that
federal Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights were not
available to the parents of children seeking educational equality. 31 It was held the trial court had properly determined that
even though federal equal protection standards were not available
to children seeking educational equality within the State, this did
not constrain a court from examining its own State Constitution

court's legal conclusion was that the State government had failed to create a thorough and efficient system of schools in Lincoln County but that the State had met
"the constitutional mandate in some counties. . ." 255 S.E.2d at 862.
92The classification was based merely on geographical lines not on the social
class or wealth of the plaintiff class.
130 John W. Lodge Distributing Co. v. Texaco Inc., 245 S.E.2d 157 (W. Va.
1978).
131 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Note that the Texas school financing plan was attacked in Rodriquez on much the
same theory as was used in this case.
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to determine whether higher standards of equal protection than
the comparable federal statutes were afforded by the State standard of protection.
The West Virginia court's survey of other state court decisions on protection afforded children seeking educational equality
recognized that those courts refused to test their respective
state's school financing formula solely on an equal protection
clause. 182 Thos courts recognized that there may be many instances where a state must spend unequal amounts among the
various school districts. The court stated that the determination
of whether a statute or governmental action violates the Equal
Protection Clause is made by the application of one of two constitutional tests. The first and more demanding test relates to fundamental rights and constitutional freedoms. Under this test, a
reviewing court must find that a compelling state interest is
served to uphold such a statute."8 8 Constitutionality of a statute
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause is also subject to
the second, more traditional standard requiring that the state law
be shown to bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state
134
purpose.
The test adopted by the West Virginia court in this situation
was the first test which relates to fundamental rights and compelling state interest. As previously noted, most state courts have
been hesitant to demand equal education for children under the
equal protection clauses of their respective state constitutions. 8
Why did the West Virginia court determine that the state's
school financing system should meet the more demanding "compelling interest test" when other courts had used only a rational
basis test? It was the court's opinion that the mandatory requirement of "a thorough and efficient system of free schools" found in
article XII, section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution clearly
demonstrated that education is a fundamental constitutional
right in the state. Because education is a fundamental right,
"82 Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Robinson v. Cahill,
62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).

'" Cimino v. Board of Education of County of Marion, 210 S.E.2d 485 (W.

Va. 1974).
'4 State ex rel. Piccirillo v. City of Follansbee, 233 S.E.2d 419 (W. Va. 1977).
"I Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Robinson v. Cahill,
62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
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under state equal protection guarantees, any discriminatory classification found in the education financing system cannot stand,
unless the State can demonstrate some compelling interest to justify the unequal treatment. 136 Furthermore, the court went on to
state that a thorough and efficient system of schools "develops, as
best the state of education expertise allows, the minds, bodies,
and social morality of its charges to prepare them for useful and
happy occupations, recreation and citizenship, and does so
1' 37
economically.'
Justice Neely dissented in this case on the grounds that the
majority of the court had overstepped the limits of the court. The
dissent would have affirmed the judgment of the lower court because the entire question comes within the classic definition of a
"political question" 38 that courts do not decide. The question
could indeed become one requiring legislative attention depending on the resolution of these issues at the trial and appellate
levels in the future.
In State ex rel. McLendon v. Morton,"39 the West Virginia
court decided that a teacher who had satisfied the objective eligibility standards for tenure adopted by a state college had a sufficient property interest 1'4 0 or "entitlement" so that he or she could
not be denied tenure on the issue of his or her competency without some procedural due process hearing. Vonceil McLendon was
an assistant professor at Parkersburg Community College. She
had six years of service and full-time employment in academic
teaching. She met all of the objective criteria to make an applic-

136 See State ex rel. Piccirillo v. City of Follansbee, 233 S.E.2d 419 (W. Va.
1977); Cinino v. Board of Education of County of Marion, 210 S.E.2d 485 (W. Va.

1974).

137 255 S.E.2d at 877. See this same page for the eight legally recognized elements of a "thorough and efficient system of schools."
138 This definition of political question was set forth in Baker v. Carr, 369

U.S. 186 (1962), when Justice Brennan indicated that a question was not justicia-

ble if it lacked judicially discoverable and manageable standards of resolution. 369
U.S. at 217.
1-1249 S.E.2d 919 (W. Va. 1978).
140

A property interest includes not only the traditional notions of real and

personal property, but also extends to those benefits to which an individual may
be deemed to have a legitimate claim of entitlement under existing rules or understandings, See Waite v. Civil Service Commission, 241 S.E.2d 164 (W. Va. 1977),

Syllabus pt. 3.
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tion for tenure.
Tenure for teachers in state-supported colleges and universities is controlled by the Board of Regents Amended Policy Bulletin No. 36, effective July 1, 1974, entitled "Policy Regarding Academic Freedom and Responsibility, Appointment, Promotion,
Tenure and Termination of Employment by Professional Personnel.' ' 4 1 Eligibility for tenure status, according to Amended Policy

Bulletin No. 36, may be attained by all full-time employees who
hold the faculty rank of assistant professor or above." 2 Vonceil
McLendon met these objective standards. Equally significant to
the case was Section 9C of the Amended Policy Bulletin which
stated hat "[T]he maximum period of probation [for tenure determination] shall not exceed seven years; and at the end of the
six years any non-tenured faculty member will be given notice in
writing of tenure, or offered a one-year written terminal contract
of employment." McLendon claimed, therefore, that once she met
the objective standards or criteria for tenure eligibility, this bestowed upon her a property interest in tenure sufficient to require
that she be afforded a procedural due process hearing before tenure could be denied her. The Board of Regents denied that the
tenure policy conferred any property interest relative to McLendon's further employment.
In considering the tenure program of both the Board of Regents and the Parkersburg Community College, the court focused
on the fact that the sixth year of a teacher's employment marks
the critical time in the tenure decision. The rules and regulations
of the college and the Board of Regents require that tenure decisions be made at the end of the sixth year of employment. Assistant professor McLendon's tenure application, in accordance with
the tenure regulations, was processed by the tenure committee
and ultimately resulted in a letter from the president of the college denying tenure. No reasons were given for the denial. It is
important to note that McLendon was not automatically entitled,
by virtue of her meeting the objective requirements in an application for tenure, to obtain tenure status. Both the Board of Re14

The authority of the Board of Regents to adopt the bulletin was not ques-

tioned in the case. This power was explicitly recognized in Sheppard v. West Virginia Board of Regents, 516 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1975). But see State ex rel. Kondos
v. West Virginia Board of Regents, 154 W. Va. 276, 175 S.E.2d 165 (1970).
142 Section 8C, Amended Policy Bulletin.
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gents' bulletin and the college regulations indicated that teaching
competency was a further criteria for obtaining tenure. However,
satisfying the objective eligibility standards for tenure gave McLendon a sufficient entitlement so that she could not be denied
tenure on the issue of her competency without some procedural
due process hearing. The court held, that under due process considerations, only a tenure denial notice which contained reasons
for the denial and a subsequent evidentiary hearing could prevent
an arbitrary and capricious denial of tenure.
The protection afforded McLendon under this rule is minimal. The tenure committee must only give notice of reasons as to
why tenure has been denied and provide the teacher with an opportunity to submit evidence relevant to the issues raised in the
notice. Only if the teacher demonstrates that the reasons given in
the notice are wholly inadequate or without a factual basis is the
administration required to prove otherwise.1 4
The court reached its decision as to the extent of the due
process protection required in this instance by considering three
distinct factors:14 4 (1) the private interest that will be affected; (2)
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a property interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest involved, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that
additional procedural requirements would entail. It was apparent
to the court that the private interest affected was of considerable
importance. Simply, once tenure is acquired it ensures that a
teacher cannot be dismissed except for specific reasons and then
not until a full due process hearing has been held. Second, the
court determined that the risk of erroneous deprivation of tenure
was apparent in light of the fact that there were no orderly procedures protecting one who met the objective standards for tenure

"4' This procedure confers little practical protection since the burden on the
teacher is simply too great to be of benefit. The teacher must demonstrate that
the reasons in the notice are "wholly inadequate." Not many teachers can meet
this standard. Theoretically, however, because tenure is of such concern to faculty
there seems to be a legitimate basis for requiring that someone who has invested
six years at a college be told the reasons why he or she is not being retained as a
tenured member of the faculty.
114 See Waite v. Civil Service Commission, 241 S.E.2d 164 (W. Va. 1977).
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eligibility. Finally, the court recognized that although the state
interest in avoiding the increased fiscal and administrative burden produced by the additional due process requirements had to
be considered, it could not measure the quality of due process
solely by the burden that it may impose.
III.

RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS

In Marra v. Zink,145 the West Virginia court affirmed the
Harrison County Circuit Court decision which held a Clarksburg,
West Virginia, City Charter provision to be unconstitutional. The
provision in question required candidates for City Council to be
city residents for one year prior to their nomination for office. On
April 15, 1977, Richard 0. Ritter presented to the Clarksburg
City Council his nomination for City Council accompanied by the
required filing fee, and he also filed a statement stating that he
had been a resident of the city of Clarksburg since August 9,
1976. 146. The City Council approved the placement of Mr. Ritter's
name on the ballot for the June 7, 1977, city election. Mr. Ritter
was elected to a four-year term on the City Council. Appellants,
as citizens and taxpayers of Clarksburg, challenged Ritter's eligibility to hold office.
On appeal, the court was asked to decide the extent to which
either the Legislature or a municipal corporation may limit access
to elected municipal office by imposing qualifications for election
in excess of those established in article IV, section 4 of the West
1 4

Virginia Constitution.

7

At the outset, the court squarely confronted its holding in
State ex rel. Thompson v. McAllister,4" in which the court stated
that the West Virginia Legislature, under authority of West Vir2;" 256 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 1979).
246 Simple arithmetic would have revealed to the Clarksburg City Council
that Mr. Ritter had not fulfilled the one-year residence requirement.
"7 Art. IV, § 4 of the West Virginia Constitution states:
No persons, except citizens entitled to vote, shall be elected or appointed to any state, county or municipal office; but the governor and
judges must have attained the age of thirty, and the attorney general
and senators the age of twenty-five years, at the beginning of their respective terms of service; and must have been citizens of the State for
five years next preceding their election or appointment, or be citizens at
the time this Constitution goes into operation.
1-8 38 W. Va. 485, 18 S.E. 770 (1893).
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ginia Constitution article IV, section 8 and its plenary law-making
power, could create qualifications for holding municipal office
which were in excess of those set forth in West Virginia Constitution article IV, section 4. Article IV, section 8 provides the authority for the Legislature to establish, by general law, "terms of
office, powers, duties, and compensation of all public officers and
agents, and the manner in which they shall be elected. ...
However, as the dissent in Thompson noted, that constitutional
of qualifications for
secton does not provide for the establishment
149
eligibility requirements of elected officials.
Consequently, the court in Marra overruled Thompson 50
and held that West Virginia Constitution article IV, section 4 is
the exclusive constitutional authority for the establishment of
qualifications for municipal office. Since the court found no direct
authority in the constitution for the Legislature to establish qualifications for office in excess of those imposed by West Virginia
Constitution article IV, section 4, qualifications other than those
imposed in article IV, section 4 were held to be unconstitutional
by their very terms. Therefore, municipalities, as creatures of the
State who draw their powers from the law which creates them,
cannot, by a city charter provision, create a condition of holding
public office which conflicts with either the state constitution or
the general laws of the state.' 5 '
The apparent authority for the city's adoption of a residency
requirement could be found in West Virginia Code section 8-5-11
which states that "[A]ny city may by charter provision. . . determine and prescribe.. . . the number, method of selection, tenure,

qualifications, residency requirements, powers and duties of municipal officers and employees. . . .. 152 However, as noted, West
Virginia Constitution article IV, section 8 does not specifically
empower the Legislature to create qualifications for office.
The appellants argued that the constitutionality of the residency requirement could be sustained as incidental to the Legis38 W. Va. at 500-01, 18 S.E. at 775-76.
15 See also State ex rel. Brewer v. Wilson, 151 W. Va. 113, 150 S.E.2d 592
(1966); State ex rel. Morrison v. Freeland, 139 W. Va. 327, 81 S.E.2d 685 (1954).
'5 See Vector Co. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Martinsburg, 155
W. Va. 362, 184 S.E.2d 301 (1971).
152 W. VA. CODE § 8-5-11 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
149
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lature's plenary power. The court rejected this argument, stating
that the evolution of constitutional law has developed strong First
Amendment and equal protection rights enabling one to become a
candidate for public office. The court decided that the one-year
residency requirement served no compelling governmental purpose in assuring that candidates were familiar with the city and
knowledgeable about local issues.1 53 In rejecting appellants' argument that the one-year residency requirement would pass both a
First Amendment and equal protection-compelling governmental
purpose test, the court found the reasoning of the California case
of Johnson v. Hamilton'5 4 to be persuasive.
The force and effect of the court's decision in Marra v. Zink
is to equate, except for those instances enumerated in West Virginia Constitution article IV, section 4, the right of suffrage with
the right to hold elective office.

153 The facts of this case further illustrate the irrationality of a one-year residency requirement. Consider that Mr. Ritter was born in Clarksburg in 1941 and
lived in the city until 1964 and then again from 1970 until 1975. In 1975 Mr.
Ritter moved to just outside the city limits of Clarksburg and then in August,
1976, moved back into the city. Would a one-year continuous residency make Mr.
Ritter more familiar with that city than he already is? The court thought not.
154 15 Cal. 3d 461, 541 P.2d 881, 125 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1975). In that case the
California court reasoned:
In terms of the education of the candidate, the argument that an
extended residence is necessary for an understanding of local issues,
while perhaps appealing in the abstract, nonetheless ignores the hard
realities bearing on the relationship of candidate and issue. The knowledge, appreciation, and comprehension of the public issues and
problems which a candidate.., possesses.., are so much the product
of the variables of motivation, intelligence, maturity, experience, opportunity, and desire as to make any fiat rule of physical residence appear
immediately suspect and arbitrary. The congeries of individual capacities for observation, study, exposure, and growth are simply so different
as to be inhospitable to a rigid fixed qualification tied to residence.
Similarly, the public's need for education and information about a
candidate are [sic] not served by a proscription so imperious as one
based upon extended physical presence alone. The advent of mass media. . ., the easy mobility of persons and image, and the increasing use
of forums, debates, and voter education programs dilute the expectancy
that voter evaluation and education can best be served by an arbitrary
residence requirement of the candidate. 125 Cal. Rptr. at 134, 541 P.2d
at 886.
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In Spradling v. Hutchinson,155 the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals held unconstitutional a West Virginia Code requirement that one seeking appointment as a police officer must
have been a resident of the city15 to which he or she was applying
for at least one year prior to the date of his or her application.
In Spradling,thirteen applicants were selected by the Police
Civil Service Commission for the City of Charleston for appointment to the Charleston Police Department and were to be sworn
in November 4, 1974. However, on November 1, the Fraternal Order of Police petitioned for an injunction against the induction of
the applicants. A temporary injunction was issued but a permanent injunction was refused. The Fraternal Order of Police appealed contending that the applicants, inter alia, did not comply
with the one-year residency requirement of West Virginia Code
section 8-14-12.157
In the decision with Justice Neely dissenting, the court found
the one year residency requirement as stated in the statute was
void. 158 The basis of the court's decision was that the statute was
repugnant to the fundamental constitutional right to travel. Since
the appellants failed to demonstrate a "compelling state interest"
for the requirement, the decision of the Kanawha County Circuit
Court was affirmed.
Residency requirements have been discussed in numerous
cases since Shapiro v. Thompson 159 when the United States Supreme Court recognized the right to travel as a fundamental constitutional right. The Court in Shapiro struck down a state statute requiring one-year residency prior to seeking welfare

195 253 S.E.2d 371 (W. Va. 1979).

statute also includes a county in which part of the city is situate. W.
Va. Code § 8-14-12 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
187The relevant portion of West Virginia Code § 8-14-12 reads as follows:
158The

"Any applicant for original appointment must have been a resident for one year,

during some period of time prior to the date of his application, of the city in
which he seeks to become a member of the said policy department ... " W. VA.
CODE § 8-14-12 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
5"8 W. VA. CODE § 8-14-12 is a long statute. The court found no reason to
invalidate those provisions of the statute that did not relate to the one-year residency requirement. In the court's words, "the remainder of the statute is severable and survives." 253 S.E.2d at 376.
159 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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assistance. After the Shapiro decision, the United States Supreme Court also found that duratorial residency requirements
for eligibility to vote 60 and for hospital and medical services's"
unconstitutionally infringed upon an individual's fundamental
right to travel.
It is important to note that not all cases discussing residency
requirements have reached the same result. In Kozewinski v. Kugler, 62 a New Jersey tenure statute which required police officers
and firemen to be residents of the municipality in which they
worked was upheld. The "compelling state interest" the court
found was the "identity with the community" ' that police officers and firemen need to perform their individual functions.
Courts, therefore, differentiate between a requirement of continuing residency, such as the case in Kozewinski,16 4 and a requirement of prior residency of a given duration. Requirements of
continuing residency have been upheld; those of prior residency
5
of a given duration struck down.

6

The one-year residency requirement of West Virginia Code
section 8-14-12 was a requirement of prior residency of a given
duration. The fundamental weakness of the one-year residency
requirement was illustrated by its applicaton in this case. Consider that the residency of one of the applicant's in Kanawha
County was only during the first eighteen months of his life' 61 obviously more than "one year, during some period of time prior
to the date of his application" that the statute prescribes. Yet, it
is irrational to assume that at age eighteen months, this applicant
was developing community knowledge that would make him a
160 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
161 Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
161 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.C.N.J. 1972).
163

Id. at 498-99.

164

See, e.g., McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission, 424 U.S.

645 (1976).

165 Some lower federal and state courts have also decided residency requirement issues. Some have found that, as to firemen and police officers, statutory
residency requirements do not violate the fundamental right to travel and hence
need only a rational basis to pass constitutional muster. See, e.g., Andre v. Board
of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F. 2d 48 (7th Cir. 1977); Wright v. City of

Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975).
166253 S.E.2d at 376.
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better policeman when he was appointed to the police force more
than two decades later. Not only did this residency requirement
fail to serve a compelling state interest, it also contained no rational basis.
Justice Neely dissented from the majority opinion, stating
that the one year residency requirement for applicants to the police force of a municipality was reasonable.1 6 7 The residency requirement, according to Justice Neely, served to insure a police
force familiar, both physically and psychologically, with the ways
of the community as well as helping to preserve the community
itself by offering work to the native sons and daughters of the
state.
IV.

PREJUDGMENT SEIZURE OF GOODS

The constitutionality of West Virginia's detinue statute was
at issue in State ex rel. Yanero v. Fox.168 Westinghouse Credit
Corporation (WCC), as assignee of several conditional sales and
installment sales contracts, filed suit in the Circuit Court of
Marion County, alleging past due payment on those contracts.
WCC also filed a bond and affidavit pursuant to West Virginia
Code section 55-6-1 to obtain prejudgment possession of the contracted-for goods.' 9 The County Clerk issued the attachment orders. Without notice to the lessees and purchasers under the contracts, the circuit court ordered the sheriffs of Marion and
Harrison counties to seize the goods. Yanero, a lessee under one
of the contracts and a purchaser under another, moved the court
to quash the seizure order. At a hearing, the court denied
Yanero's motion but suspended his seizure order so that Yanero
could seek a writ of prohibition from the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals.
The court held that before a prejudgment seizure can occur,
a hearing must be held to determine whether or not a seizure is
proper. 70 The parties which will be affected by the seizure must
be given notice of the hearing and an opportunity to attend the

167 Id. at 376-77 (Neely, J. dissenting).
168 256 S.E.2d 751 (W. Va. 1979).
619Id. at 752.
170

Id. at 757.
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hearing and represent their interests. 17 1 Thus, those portions of
the West Virginia detinue statute 172 which allow government officials to seize property in the possession of one party and deliver
the property to another party without prior notice and hearing
are an unconstitutional violation of the due process clause of the
West Virginia Constitution.17
The court, however, denied Yanero's application for a writ of
prohibition.17 4 The court felt that the pre-seizure hearing on
Yanero's motion to quash the seizure order was a hearing on the
merits of whether seizure should be allowed, and, thus, the re75
quirements of due process had been fulfilled.1
Cheryl Lee Davis
Edgar A. Poe, Jr.

7 6

CONTRACTS1

In Floyd v. Watson,1 7 7 the Supreme Court of Appeals ordered

specific performance of a settlement agreement to build a wall
and conveyance of part of the property on which it was built. The
case is significant because it involves the specific performance of a
construction agreement.
In Floyd, the owners of a housing subdivision, the Watsons,
entered into a contract with the plaintiffs (the Floyds) "whereby
the Watsons agreed to sell real property to the Tloyds and construct a house and appurtenances upon the property according to
specifications attached to the agreement."' 1 Among the appurtenances to be built was a wall upon which the dispute centered.
The house was built and the property was deeded over to the
Floyds. However, the Watsons failed to complete construction of
the wall as promised in their contract. Furthermore, the portion
171

Id.

171 W. VA. CODE §§

55-6-1 to -7 (1966).

171 256 S.E.2d 751, 757 (W. Va. 1979).
174

Id.

175

Id.

The contempt aspect of Floyd v. Watson, 254 S.E.2d 687 (W. Va. 1979), is
discussed in the PROCEDURE section of this survey.
177 254 S.E.2d 687 (W. Va. 1979).
178 Id. at 688.
17'
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of the wall that was completed extended onto part of the defendants' property, and proper completion of the construction required that it extend further onto the Watsons' property.
The Floyds sued the Watsons to force construction of the
wall and conveyance of the additional property to them. However,
prior to trial, the parties reached an oral compromise by which
the defendant Billy J. Watson agreed to:
1. Tender plaintiffs a deed for the property on which the
front wall was sitting;
2. continue the wall along the diagonal portion of the plaintiffs' property, and
3. furnish to plaintiffs a deed to any property owned by the
defendants if any portion
of said wall had to be erected on the
17
defendants' property.

Upon the defendants' failure to comply with the above agreement, the Floyds brought a second suit, this time seeking specific
performance of the so-called settlement agreement. The trial
court granted the relief requested. 80
On appeal, the court reviewed the action of the trial court in
granting specific performance of a settlement agreement which
called for construction of contracted work. The order of the trial
court was affirmed. Although the settlement agreement is never
expressly referred to as a construction contract in the opinion, the
Supreme Court of Appeals nonetheless discussed the historical reluctance of courts to grant the remedy of specific performance for
such contractual agreements. The court also noted that specific
performance may be granted to enforce a compromise agreement,
"assuming other requisites for this remedy are met."' 8 ' The court
cited the rule that specific performance is not ordinarily decreed
in construction contracts largely because of the impracticality of
court supervision of the work combined with the usual availability of another remedy. However, courts do have discretion to
grant such a remedy where "the particulars of the work are definitely ascertained, plaintiff has a substantial interest in having
Id. at 689 n.1.
180 The terms of the oral compromise were incorporated in the court order
which "designated the location of the wall and required the Watsons to complete
construction and to deed to the Floyds the requisite property." Id.
179

181 Id. at 690.
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the contract performed, and money damages will not provide an
adequate remedy.' ' 182 However, rather than discussing the applicability of this rule to the case at bar, the court simply affirmed
the holding of the lower court with the following statement: "The
agreement here includes a provision for conveyance of land, and
therefore specific performance is proper." 8 3
It is difficult to assess the exact parameters of this decision.
Quite obviously specific performance is appropriate to enforce a
contract for the sale of land, but such a holding is hardly seminal. 8' The uniqueness of this decision in West Virginia jurisprudence lies in that part of the opinion allowing specific performance of an agreement to construct a wall. However, it is hard to
ascertain whether such a remedy could be had if the settlement
agreement contained only a promise to perform services. The language of the opinion suggests that specific performance may be
decreed on a construction contract which also requires the transfer of real property. One may infer from the opinion that specific
performance could be decreed on a construction contract where
"the particulars of the work are definitely ascertained, plaintiff
has a substantial interest in having the contract performed, and
money damages will not provide an adequate remedy." 8 5 However, such was not the factual situation presented to the court in
Floyd and hence, the intended scope and effect of the abovequoted language is uncertain.
Sarah G. Sullivan
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
I.
A.

INSTRUCTIONS

Invalid Instruction-InvitedError

In a case of first impression in West Virginia, the court in

182 Id.
183 Id. A 1978 decision by the Michigan Court of Appeals was discussed, supporting the rule that specific performance is the appropriate remedy for breach of

a contract for the sale of land.
184 "The would-be purchaser under a land contract can ordinarily obtain an
equitable decree of specific performance, in which the court will order vendor to

convey the land according to the terms of the contract." D. DOBBS,
THE LAW OF REMEDIES §

HANDBOOK ON

12.10 (1973).

185 254 S.E.2d at 690.
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State v. Dozier'8 6 faced the question of whether a defendant may
challenge on appeal the legality of giving a defective jury instruction which was given at the request of the defendant's attorney.
The trial judge gave a jury instruction, requested by Mrs. Dozier's
court-appointed attorney, which impermissibly relieved the state
of its burden of proof respecting the intent element of murder in
violation of State v. Pendry.87 Mrs. Dozier was convicted of first
degree murder.
' The court held that the offer of the defective instruction by
the defendant's attorney was not invited error and, thus, Dozier
could challenge on appeal the legality of giving the defective instruction. 8 8 The court rejected the idea that the defendant had
waived her right to a constitutionally correct instruction by 'her
attorney's tender of the defective instruction. 189 The court reasoned that since the defendant herself did not know that a constitutionally erroneous instruction was offered on her behalf, she
had not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of her right to a
constitutionally firm instruction. Further, the court placed on the
trial judge the responsibility for giving constitutionally correct
jury instructions. The court held the trial judge had erred in not
refusing to give a patently unconstitutional instruction. Also,
there was no evidence that defense counsel had deliberately used
the defective instruction to create error in order to obtain a rever90
sal in case of conviction.2
The court noted that if the improper instruction had been
contained in a charge prepared by the trial judge and given without objection of the defendant's counsel or offered by the state
without objection by the defendant's counsel, the trial court or
appellate court could notice plain error in the giving of such an
instruction in order to avoid manifest injustice or clear prejudice
to a party. The court felt that no distinction should be made be-tween those situations and the situation in which the defective
instruction is offered by the defendant.' 9'

186

255 S.E.2d 552 (W. Va. 1979).

87

227 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va. 1976).

188 255 S.E.2d 552, 555 (W. Va. 1979).
189

Id.

190 Id.

191 Id.
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B. Self-Defense
In State v. Kirtley,'9 ' the defendant Kirtley appealed his
conviction for involuntary manslaughter in a stabbing death by
challenging the legality of certain jury instructions which were
given at trial. The jury was instructed that the use of a deadly
weapon in the commission of a homocide raises a presumption of
malice. The jury was also instructed that the defendant has the
burden of proving the defense of self-defense by a preponderance
of the evidence.
On appeal, the court struck down the instruction concerning
the presumption of malice as obviously defective under State v.
Pendry.'93 The court, however, rejected the defendant's argument
that the giving of that constitutionally infirm jury instruction
alone was sufficient to reverse the conviction for involuntary manslaughter. 94 The court reasoned that since the guilty verdict was
for an offense that does not have malice as an element, the instruction could not have affected the jury's fact finding process
and, therefore, the error in giving the defective instruction was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In his concurring opinion,
Justice Harshbarger argued that any constitutional error is harmful and, thus, the defective instruction was grounds for reversal.9 5
The court did, however, reverse Kirtley's conviction and remand the case for a new trial on the grounds that the instruction
on self-defense was improper. The court held that once there is
sufficient evidence introduced in the case to create a reasonable
doubt that the killing resulted from the defendant acting in selfdefense, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not act in self-defense.196
II.

PRESENTENCING REPORTS

The question of the right of a defendant or his attorney to
examine a presentence report was addressed by the court for the
first time in State v. Byrd. 9 7 The court adopted Rule 32(c)(3) of
9-2252 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1978).
193 Id. at 376; 227 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va. 1976).

1- 252 S.E.2d 374, 378 (W. Va. 1978).
198Id. at 382.
196 Id. at 381.
1 7 256 S.E.2d 323 (W. Va. 1979).
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the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as the standard in West
Virginia.198 This rule requires the trial court, upon request, to allow the defendant or his attorney to read the presentence report
prior to sentencing. The defendant may not read any portion of
the report which recommends a particular sentence. The trial
judge has discretion to omit certain other matters from the defendant's examination of the report. If such information is omitted,
however, the court must give an oral or written summary to the
defendant of the factual information contained in the omitted
portion. In regard to both the report and the court's summary of
omitted portions, the defendant has the right to comment on the
information contained therein, and at the discretion of the trial
judge, to introduce evidence relating to alleged factual inaccuracies. The discretion of the judge as to the introduction of evidence may be tested on appeal. Any information disclosed to the
defendant must also be disclosed to the prosecution.
III.

IDENTIFICATION IN A WARRANT

In State ex rel. Gonzales v. Wilt, 199 the court dealt with the
issue of the burden of proving the identity of a person named in a
fugitive warrant. Benito Gonzales was arrested in West Virginia
on the basis that he was the man described in a fugitive warrant
issued by Texas authorities. Seeking to avoid extradition to
Texas, Gonzales filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was not the person named in the warrant.200 The state
offered no evidence to contradict Gonzales' allegations, relying instead on the warrant and documents from Texas officials describing the person sought.
The court noted that the fugitive warrant, regular on its
face, makes a prima facie case for extradition.201 However, if the
accused presents evidence that he is not the person named in the
warrant, the issue of identity is raised, and the burden is then on
198 Id. at 324.

299 256 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 1979).
210 Specifically, Gonzales alleged that he had never used the name of the person charged in the Texas indictment, and that he did not have the physical characteristics of the person sought as described in identification documents furnished
by Texas authorities.
201 256 S.E.2d 15, 18 (W. Va. 1979).
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the state to prove identity. 202 Thus, the court ordered Gonzales
freed from custody, since he had raised the issue of identity and
the state had failed to meet the burden of proving identity. The
court did not specify what quantity of evidence is sufficient on
the part of the defendant to raise the issue of identity, or what
evidence is sufficient on the part of the state to satisfy the burden of proving identity.
IV.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

The court construed the double jeopardy clause of the West
Virginia Constitution in State ex rel. Dowdy v. Robiison.20 3 The
indictment charged Dowdy with breaking and entering a building
located at 200-22nd Street in Huntington. Proof was adduced at
trial that the building in question was located at 220-22nd Street
rather than at 200-22nd Street as provided in the indictment.
Dowdy moved for a directed verdict of acquittal, arguing that the
misdescription of the street address was a fatal variance between
the indictment and the proof. The trial court granted Dowdy's
motion. Dowdy was then reindicted using an indictment which
contained the correct street address. Dowdy sought a writ of prohibition to prohibit the circuit court judge from trying him under
the second indictment on the grounds that the trial would impermissibly place him in double jeopardy in violation of the United
States and West Virginia Constitutions.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals granted the
writ of prohibition. The key factor, in the court's view, was that
the first trial had been terminated by a verdict of acquittal. The
court stated that after a judgment acquitting a defendant, a retrial on the same offense is impermissible, no matter how erroneous the acquittal may have been.2 04 In Dowdy, the trial judge had
options available to correct the misdescription in the indictment

202

Id. In the earlier case of State ex rel. Mitchell v. Allen, 155 W. Va. 530,

185 S.E.2d 355 (1971), the court held that in a habeas corpus proceeding instituted to determine the validity of custody where the petitioner is being held in
connection with extradition proceedings, the court in the asylum state may properly consider whether the petitioner is the person named in the extradition
warrant.
203

257 S.E.2d 167 (W. Va. 1979).

204

Id. at 171.
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which could have avoided the jeopardy problem." 5 However,
since the trial judge chose the option of granting a verdict of acquittal, this factor was controlling in the disposition of the case.
Based upon this analysis, the court then declared West Virginia
Code section 61-11-14206 unconstitutional as a violation of the
double jeopardy clause of both the United States 207 and West Virginia 0° Constitutions because the code section permitted retrial
in certain circumstances after a verdict of acquittal. 20 9
In deciding whether the attempted second trial was for the
"same offense" as that term is used in the double jeopardy clause
of the West Virginia Constitution, the court stated that "same
offense" will be defined by either the same evidence or the same
transaction test, whichever test offers the defendant greater protection.210 Under the same evidence test, the two offenses are the
same unless one offense requires proof of a fact which the other
offense does not.211 Under the same transaction test, the two offenses are the same if they grew out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode or transaction. 2 2 In Dowdy the court found
that the defendant's only transgression was the breaking and entering of a building on 22nd Street. Thus, under the same transaction test, the attempted second trial violated the constitutional
prohibition against twice being put in jeopardy for the same
205 Id. The court stated that in order to avoid the double jeopardy problem
the trial judge could have either struck the street address in the original indictment as surplusage on the grounds that the remainder of the indictment fully

informed the defendant of the charges against him or granted a mistrial for manifest necessity.
200 W. VA. CODE § 61-11-14 (1977 Replacement Vol.) provides:
A person acquitted of an offense, on the ground of a variance between
the allegations and the proof of the indictment or other accusation, or
upon an exception to the form or substance thereof, may be arraigned
again upon a new indictment or other proper accusation, and tried and
convicted for the same offense, notwithstanding such former acquittal.
207 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
0oW. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5.
209 257 S.E.2d 167, 171 (W. Va. 1979).
210 Id. at 170.
21 Id. The same

evidence test was developed in the majority opinions in
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), and Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S.
161 (1977).
2" Id. at 169. The same transaction test was developed in Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 170 (1977).
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offense.21 s

Justice Miller entered a very strong dissent. He argued that a
defendant is acquitted only when the ruling of the trial judge actually represents a resolution in the defendant's favor of an essential factual element of the offense charged or a resolution in the
defendant's favor of an essential factual element of an affirmative
defense of the defendant. 2 14 In the instant case, the resolution in
favor of the defendant was on an issue unrelated to an element of
the crime or his defense; instead, the resolution below was based
on mere surplusage, i.e., the incorrect street address. Justice
Miller felt that an appellate court must look beyond the trial
court's labeling of the motion that terminates the trial 2and
focus
15
instead on the substantive nature of the court's ruling.
V.

WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

In State v. Bradley,21 6 the court dealt with the issue of

waiver of the right to counsel. Bradley was suspected in the murder of a fellow inmate in the county jail. Before his arrest, Bradley had been advised of his Miranda217 rights twice and asked to
sign a written waiver of those rights. On both occasions Bradley
refused to sign the waiver and asked to see a lawyer. The sheriff
failed to arrange for Bradley to obtain counsel and Bradley was
later arrested on the murder charge. After his arrest and before
he had obtained counsel, Bradley made oral statements to police
officers which implicated him in the murder. These statements
were admitted into evidence in the trial at which Bradley was
convicted. The propriety of the admission of those statements
was at issue before the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
The court rejected the State's argument that the defendant
had waived his right to counsel by making the statements to the
police. The court held that, if after requesting counsel, an accused
recants his request before counsel can reasonably be secured, the
212 Id. at 171.
214

Id. at 174. Justice Miller based this argument on the holding in United

States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
215

Id. at 172.

216

255 S.E.2d 356 (W. Va. 1979).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

217
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heavy burden of the state to prove waiver is even heavier.2 8 This
burden can best be met by a written statement, signed by the
defendant, affirming the relinquishment of his theretofore asserted constitutional rights. Only when the defendant's intention
to waive the right to counsel is clear may interrogation proceed. 219
In Bradley, the state had failed to meet its heavy burden of proving waiver. The defendant had not signed a written waiver of his
right to counsel. Further, the court noted that Bradley had on
two occasions specifically requested counsel and also had twice
refused to sign a waiver of his right to counsel. Thus, the incriminating statements Bradley made to the police officers should not
have been admitted at trial since those statements were obtained
in violation of Bradley's right to have counsel present during
interrogation.
VI.. GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS

In State v. Frazier,220 the defendant was convicted for delivering marijuana. During the grand jury proceeding, the state
trooper who investigated the case was allowed to remain in the
grand jury room after testifying. While in the grand jury room,
the trooper questioned other witnesses who also gave evidence
against the defendant. The defendant's conviction was overturned
by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals on the basis of
the long-standing Wetzel rule that while the grand jury is considering evidence, no other witnesses are allowed to be present in the
grand jury room. 221 In Frazier the error was compounded when
the trooper questioned the other witnesses. The court in applying
the Wetzel rule recognized that "[i]t cannot be expected that law
enforcement officials who are directly involved with the solution

255 S.E.2d 356, 358 (W. Va. 1979).
Id.
220 252 S.E.2d 39 (W. Va. 1979). For a further discussion of this case see Comment, 82 W. VA. L. Rnv. 703 (1980).
221 State v. Wetzel, 75 W. Va. 7, 83 S.E. 68 (1914). The court stated:
It is the policy of the law to preserve inviolate the secrecy of proceedings
before the grand jury and the discussion of evidence before them relating to an alleged crime which they are considering, by persons not sworn
to testify as witnesses, will vitiate an indictment returned by them
whether they were actually influenced by such discussion or not. The
law seeks to guard against even the possibility of such influence. 75 W.
Va. 7, 83 S.E. 68, Syll. pt. 4.
218

219
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of a crime and the prosecution of its perpetrators will maintain an
impartial role. ' 222 However, the court refused to speculate as to
whether the Wetzel rule would apply to a mere accidental intrusion of such officials into the grand jury room.

VII. ARRAIGNMENT
At issue in State v. Grimmer223 was the failure of the prosecution to properly arraign the defendant. The defendant appealed
his conviction as an accomplice to a shotgun murder following a
robbery-burglary attempt. The record failed to show that any arraignment had actually taken place. The defendant was fully
aware of the charges against him, however, since a copy of the
indictment had been given to him. He filed numerous motions
and pleadings seeking, more detailed information of the charge
and was given a bill of particulars. The defendant had a jury trial
which resulted in a guilty verdict against him.
It has been the long-standing rule in this state, as first announced in State v. Moore, that the defendant must be "present
in court, and plead to the indictment against him in person, and
the record must affirmatively show this."'22 ' However, West Virginia Code section 62-3-2 does not provide that a formal arraignment is required. 225 In considering whether the failure to arraign
the defendant constituted prejudicial error, the court noted that
everything in the arraignment proceeding had been completed except the taking and recording of the plea. The essential elements
of a sufficient arraignment, fully advising the defendant of the
nature of the charge, of the right of hajury trial, and of the consequences of any plea tendered, 226 were compiled within the partic-

222

252 S.E.2d at 42.

223 251 S.E.2d 780 (W. Va. 1979). The Fifth Amendment aspect of this case is

discussed in the CONSTITUTIONAL LAW section of this survey.
224 57 W. Va. 146, 147, 49 S.E. 1015 (1905). The point was made in subsequent cases including State v. McGee, 230 S.E.2d 832 (1976).
225 W. VA. CODE § 62-3-2 (1977 Replacement Vol.) provides:
A person indicted for felony shall be personally present during the trial
therefor. If he refuse to plead or answer ... the trial shall proceed as if
the accused had entered that [not guilty] plea .... The formal arraignment of the prisoner, the proclamation by the sheriff, and the charge of
the clerk to the jury ... shall be dispensed with.
221See State ex rel. Burkhamer v. Adams, 143 W. Va. 557, 103 S.E.2d 777
(1958).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol82/iss3/20

46

et al.: Survey of Developments in West Virginia Law: 1979
1980]

SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS

ular case. The court concluded that the defendant had not been
deprived of any essential right affecting his trial and as such the
failure to record the arraignment under the circumstances in the
case constituted harmless error. The court thus overruled State v.
Moore which required the record to show an arraignment in every
case.
VIII.

CONFESSION

In State v. Vance, 227 the admissibility of the defendant's confession at trial was in issue. The trial court, after an in camera
hearing, determined that the defendant's statements had been
voluntarily made and thus admitted them into evidence. However, the jury was not instructed as to the voluntariness of the
statements. The defense did not offer any instructions nor did the
court give any instructions concerning the confession.
It is recognized that the state must prove by a preponderance
of evidence that any confession of an accused was made voluntarily before such confession may be admitted into evidence during the trial of a criminal case. 228 But there is a split of authority

on the procedures to be used in making the voluntariness determination. The majority of jurisdictions follow the "Wigmore" or
"orthodox" rule under which the trial judge makes the sole and
final determination as a matter of law as to the voluntariness of
the confession. The jury only weighs the credibility or weight
given the confession. The jury only weighs the credibility or
weight given the confession if it is admitted into evidence. In
other jurisdictions, the "Massachusetts" or "humane" rule is followed and under this rule the court makes the initial determination of voluntariness and then the jury is instructed that they
must find the confession to have229been voluntarily given before
they may consider it as evidence.

In West Virginia, there has been inconsistency as to the
method to be used under the two lines of authority. 230 In adopting
250 S.E.2d 146 (W. Va. 1978).
State v. Starr, 216 S.E.2d 242 (W. Va. 1975), citing Lego v. Twomey, 404
U.S. 477 (1972) which rejected a reasonable doubt standard. The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals declined in Vance to require a reasonable doubt standard at this time.
227

228

229

See generally WHARfON'S CRIMiNAL EVIDENCE § 672 (C.E. Torcia 13 ed.

1979); 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 587 (1967).
210 See 250 S.E.2d 146 at 150 n.3 for a listing of cases following each view in
West Virginia. See also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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the "Massachusetts" or "humane" rule, the court quoted the Supreme Court of Vermont:
[W]e feel the so-called 'orthodox' rule contains aspects of
harshness inconsistent with the general administration of
criminal law in this jurisdiction. It attaches to the preliminary
determination of the court an aura of infallibility which, while
it may be consistent with the requirements of the constitution,
is not consistent
with the general concepts of the right to jury
23 1
trial.

However, the court did not find reversible error in the failure
to give instructions with respect to the confession. The court did
rule that in all future trials where an objection is made to the
admission of a confession on the grounds of voluntariness, the defendant is entitled to an instruction upon request. Justice McGraw would have gone a23step
further by requiring instructions
2
whether requested or not.
The issue addressed in State v. Canby233 was the admissibility of a confession made after an illegal arrest. The defendant was
arrested without a warrant and immediately taken to the county
jail for questioning. He confessed to participation in a series of
barn burnings. He was not taken before a justice of the peace for
more than 23 hours after his arrest. The defendant sought reversal of his conviction for second degree arson on the grounds that
his confession was a direct result of an illegal arrest and that the
confession had been obtained without compliance with West Virgina Code section 62-1-5134 requiring the presentation of an accused party before a magistrate without delay.
Based upon the facts of the case, the court found that the
oral confession had resulted from the illegal arrest but could not
find any causal connection between the arrest and the confession.
The court had previously held that noncompliance with West Virginia Code section 62-1-5 would not invalidate a confession obState v. Harbaugh, 132 Vt. 569, 579, 326 A.2d 821, 827 (1974).
250 S.E.2d at 151.
233 252 S.E.2d 164 (W. Va. 1979).
234 W. VA. CODE § 62-1-5 (1977 Replacement Vol.) provides:
An officer making an arrest... shall take the arrested person without
unnecessary delay before a justice of the county in which the arrest is
made ....
231

232
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tained pursuant to a legal arrest.23 5 The court stated that where
noncompliance is combined with an illegal arrest, exclusion of the
confession is mandated to insure protection under West Virginia
Constitution, article III, section 6.286 However, the court stopped
short of requiring a mandatory exclusion in all situations, such as
where there has been a clear showing of circumstances sufficient
to break the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the
23 7
confession.
IX.

SPEEDY TRIAL

In State v. Cox 238 the defendant alleged that he had been
denied a speedy trial because there had been a delay of two and
one half years from the time of the indictment until his trial.
However, the defendant never asserted any right to a speedy trial
until two years after the indictment had been returned. The main
reason for the delay was the incarceration of the defendant in a
federal penitentiary.
In determining that the defendant was not denied his right to
a speedy trial, the court applied the balancing approach used in
Barker v. Wingo,2=9 where the conduct of the defendant and government are weighed against one another. The factors considered
in the balancing process are the length of delay, the reason for the
delay, the defendant's assertion of his rights, and any prejudice
resulting to the defendant. The court stated that none of the factors alone is sufficient to support a finding of a deprivation of the
right to a speedy trial.
X.

PLEA BARGAINING

The enforceability of a promise made by a law enforcement
officer to a defendant during questioning was considered in State
213 State
236

v. Mason, 249 S.E.2d 793 (W. Va. 1978).

W. VA. CONsT. art. III,

§

6

provides:

The rights of the citizens to be secure in their houses, persons, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated.

The West Virginia court followed the federal approach developed in
Brown v. Illinois, 442 U.S. 590 (1975), by not requiring mandatory exclusion.
228 253 S.E.2d 517 (W. Va. 1979).
237

29

407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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v. Cox. 240 The defendant alleged that he was promised immunity
from prosecution in exchange for certain information.
When charges were brought, the defendant sought to terminate the prosecution by enforcement of an agreement allowing
him to plead guilty to a specific offense. The court noted that a
plea bargaining agreement may be specifically enforced 4 1 when it
is shown that the party has relied detrimentally on the agreement. 242 The court found that the defendant had not proven any
detrimental reliance and held that law enforcement officers do
not have authority to promise that a defendant will not be prosecuted in exchange for information, thus rendering the agreement
unenforceable. However, the court did note that a situation might
exist in which an uneducated person would perceive a law enforcement officer as being a voice of authority so as to justify reliance on the official's representations. 24 3 It appears that if the defendant can prove that he detrimentally relied on what he
thought was the voice of authority, then he can have the prosecution terminated.
XI.

MALICE AND CAPACITY

In State v. Brant,2 " the defendnt was convicted of second
degree murder. On the afternoon of February 11, 1976, the defendant and a friend, David Harless, began drinking substantial
quantities of beer and whisky and continued most of the evening.
Around 9:00 p.m., they took a friend, Douglas Dawson, home. Mr.
Dawson was awakened at 2:00 a.m. and returned to the Iaeger
Cafe which the defendant had recently purchased. He joined the
defendant and Harless in drinking. The cafe was full of empty
bottles and cans. When Mr. Dawson prepared to leave at 5:00
a.m., the defendant drew a gun and said to Harless, "Okay,
David, we are not going to tear any more of this stuff up," and
proceeded to shoot Harless, who turned and said, "Willie, shoot
again." The defendant and David Harless were close friends, future business partners, and had never argued or shown any out240 253 S.E.2d 517 (W. Va. 1979).

24 Brooks v. Narick, 243 S.E.2d 841 (W. Va. 1978).
242 State v. Wayne, 245 S.E.2d 838 (W. Va. 1978).
242 253 S.E.2d 517, 521 n.2.
2" 252 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1979).
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ward signs of aggression.
On appeal, the court held that the giving of an instruction
that malice may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon is
erroneous where the state's own evidence affirmatively shows an
absence of malice. However, the inference of malice from the intentional use of a deadly weapon will continue to be allowed in
the majority of cases.24 5 The court also examined the traditional
rule concerning the defense of intoxication in criminal cases. The
general rule is that intoxication is not a proper defense unless two
generally recognized exceptions apply.24 s The court assumed that
the intoxication in the particular case impaired the defendant's
nervous system so completely as to cause total incapacitation.
Based upon the facts, the court held that there was a total breakdown of the defendant's system, such that no malice could be inferred despite the use of a deadly weapon.
The court limited its ruling to the facts of the case and
reiterated:
that intoxication can never be used as a defense where it is
alleged that there was diminished capacity, except where previous exceptions apply, but can only be used when there is
demonstrated a total lack of capacity such that the bodily machine completely fails. Furthermore, where a weapon is involved it must affirmatively appear that the defendant had no
predisposition to commit the crime or to engage in aggressive
anti-social conduct
which the voluntary intoxication brought
27
to the forefront.

XII.

PRETRIAL ORIENTATION

In another aspect of State v.
20

Vance,248

/

the defendant had

State v. Toler, 129 W. Va. 575, 41 S.E.2d 850 (1946).

The two exceptions to the rule denying intoxication as a defense in criminal matters are: (1) it may be considered to reduce first degree murder to second
degree murder because it can negate the element of premeditation and deliberation required for a conviction of first degree. State v. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713
(1882); (2) it can serve as a defense to a specific intent crime such as burglary
when it appears that the defendant was so incapacitated that he could not formulate the intent to commit a felony after breaking and entering. State v. Phillips, 80
W. Va. 748, 93 S.E. 828 (1917).
247 252 S.E.2d at 904.
248 250 S.E.2d 146 (W. Va. 1978). The confession aspect of this case was discussed in a preceding segment of this section.
2,1
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moved to disqualify the entire panel of petit jurors on the
grounds that the judge had held a private orientation meeting
with jurors on the first day of duty. The orientation meeting was
not recorded but there was no evidence that the defendant or his
client was purposefully excluded. The basis of the defendant's argument was that there was no way of determining whether improper remarks were made to the prospective jurors.
The court could find no prior West Virginia cases concerning
pretrial orientation, but the court did take judicial notice of the
fact that several judicial circuits conduct orientation meetings 2to
49
instruct prospective jurors of their duties and responsibilities.
Most jurisdictions and federal courts use juror handbooks to prevent a slip of the tongue or an erroneous statement of law which
would present a danger to the accused's right to a fair and impartial trial.2 0 The court held, on a prospective basis, that a court
reporter must record all proceedings during pretrial orientation.
Because the defendant failed to show any prejudice, the court did
not reverse the conviction.
XIII.

DEFENDANT AND WITNESS ATTIRE

Although the United States Supreme Court has determined
that it is error to violate a defendant's constitutional right to wear
civilian attire at trial, 51 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has recently determined that there is one situation in which
that error will be deemed harmless. In State ex rel McMannis v.
Mohn 52 the defendant had been confined in the state penitentiary on a felony conviction. At the time of his subsequent trial,
he had been returned to Mineral County to be tried for a sexual
offense which allegedly occurred in the Mineral County Jail while
he was awaiting a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus relating to
the previous felony conviction. Throughout his trial he was
clothed in prison issue bearing the inscriptions "West Virginia
Penitentiary" and "WVP" both on the seat of the pants and the
back of the shirt. The defendant's attorney did not object to this
attire until after he had examined the first defense witness and
249 Id. at 151-52.
2Z0 Id. at 152.
251

See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).

31, 254 S.E.2d 805 (W. Va. 1978).
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had called his second.
The court held that
a criminal defendant has the right under the Due Process
Clause of our State and Federal Constitutions not to be forced
to trial in identifiable prison attire. However, where a criminal
defendant is tried in identifiable prison attire without any initial objection, and the offense for which he is tried is prisonrelated such that the jury necessarily knows from the evidence
that he was in prison at the time of the commission of the
offense, the error will be deemed not prejudicial under the doctrine of harmless constitutional error.2 53
If there is an objection at the start of trial or if the charged of-

fense is not prison related, the defendant's constitutional guarantee to be presumed innocent until proven guilty is violated if he is

tried in identifiable prison garb.
Since the right of the accused to be tried in civilian attire is
bottomed on his constitutionally sanctioned presumption of inno2
cence, it was held by the court not to extend to his witnesses. "
Thus, the court stated that the accused had no constitutional
right to have his witnesses appear at trial without physical restraints or in civilian attire. Although this may substantially impair the credibility of their testimony in the jury's mind, it does
not reach the status of a constitutional guarantee. However, the
court did acknowledge that, had the case been under review on an
appeal rather than by a habeas corpus proceeding, it may have
resulted in reversible error if a timely objection had been made.
XIV.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE
2 55

the court reaffirmed principles appliIn State v. Williams
cable in determining the voluntariness of a search by consent.
The case arose when five police officers confronted Williams without a warrant at his home in the early morning hours. Williams
was taken to the police barracks and given a detailed explanation
of his Miranda rights. Because the police were aware of Williams'
limited intelligence, every effort was made to ensure he understood his rights. Shortly after arriving at the station, the police

211Id. at 808.
2U

Id.

255 249

S.E.2d 758 (W. Va. 1979).
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officers asked the defendant if he would show them the contents
of his pants pockets and he did so. Later, the officers searched the
defendant's jacket and found a watch in the lining bearing the
victim's initials. After being confronted with the watch, the defendant admitted playing a minor role in the crime. At trial, the
watch and the confession were introduced into evidence, Following a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, the defendant was
sentenced to life imprisonment, without a recommendation of
mercy. On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
held that considering the totality of the circumstances, the defendant did not freely and voluntarily consent to the search of his
jacket, and therefore it was error to admit the watch into
evidence.
The factors to be considered in determining whether consent
to a search has been voluntarily given were listed by the court.
Although the court examined all of the circumstances surrounding the case, a number of elements were given particular attention. The court's major concern was whether the defendant was in
custody when the consent was given. The theory that there is a
heightened possibility of coercion where the alleged consent was
made by a person in custody was acknowledged by the court.2 50
Thus, an alleged consent to search while in custody must be subjected to the most careful scrutiny.
Other factors to be considered in the determination of voluntariness included the authority of the person consenting to the
search, knowledge of the constitutional right to refuse permission
to search, and the intelligence of the person consenting to the
search. While these are some of the factors to be used by the
court in making its determintion, it was made clear that "whether
a consent to a search is in fact voluntary or is the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances.

XV.

' 25 7

ARREST

On February 20, 1979, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, in State v. Canby,258 significantly changed the law relating to warrantless arrest. Canby was arrested at his home on July
211 State

v. Thomas, 203 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1974).

25 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
258252 S.E.2d 164 (W. Va. 1979).
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16, 1975 without a warrant and was immediately taken to the
Berkeley County Jail for questioning where he orally confessed to
participation in numerous barn burnings. He sought reversal of
his conviction, contending that the oral confession was improperly admitted at his trial since it was the result of an illegal arrest. The court agreed with the appellant and reversed the trial
court's decision.
The court first recognized that both the Constitution of the
United States 259 and the Constitution of West Virginia280 protect
citizens from unreasonable arrests, searches, and seizures. The
court noted that the general method for implementing that protection is in the requirement that a warrant based on a showing
of probable cause must be obtained from a neutral magistrate
before an arrest, search, or seizure may be initiated.
Affirming the long-standing rule that warrantless arrests,
searches, and seizures are generally unreasonable, the court held
that two requirements must be satisfied in order for a police officer to make a warrantless arrest. First, the officer must have, at
the time of the arrest, sufficient reliable evidence to provide a
strong showing of probable cause. The court added a new requirement that there must be exigent circumstances, not of the police
officer's creation, which militate in favor of immediate arrest. Justice Neely writing for the court stated that
the test of exigent circumstances for making an arrest for a
felony without a warrant in West Virginia is whether, under
the totality of the circumstances, the police had reasonable
grounds to believe that if an immediate arrest were not made
the accused would be able to destroy evidence, flee or'otherwise avoid capture, or might, during the time necessary to procure a warrant, endanger the safety or property of others.' "I
The standard used in determining whether or not exigent circumstances are present is what a reasonable, well-trained police officer would believe, not what the arresting officer actually did believe. Also, the court stated that the rarity of justifiable
warrantless arrests is increased by the requirement under the new
magistrate court system that a magistrate be available twenty:59

U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
CONST. art. III, §

60W. VA.
261

6.

252 S.E.2d at 167 (W. Va. 1979)..

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1980

55

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 20

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

four hours a day.282

The court has deviated from the federal rule on warrantless
arrests by making exigent circumstances an added requirement in
all felony cases. In United States v. Watson,268 the United States
Supreme Court declined to condition warrantless arrest power on
proof of exigent circumstances since the rule "has for so long been
to authorize warrantless public arrests on probable cause rather
than to encumber criminal prosecutions with endless litigation
with respect to the existance of exigent circumstances, whether it
was practicable to get a warrant, whether the suspect was about
to flee and the like. ' '264 Thus, the West Virginia Supreme Court of

Appeals has taken an additional step toward the protection of individual rights.
XVI.

IN CAMERA HEARING ON THE VOLUNTARINESS OF A
CONFESSION

In State v. Staley265 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reaffirmed its position requiring an in camera hearing on
the voluntariness of a confession. On December 27, 1969, Edward
Mullen was brutally beaten at his home and subsequently died.
At approximately 3:15 p.m. that afternoon the petitioner, who
lived with Mullen, was arrested. He was taken to the county jail
and was placed in a conference room, where he remained until the
deputy sheriff arrived around 9:00 p.m. At 9:12 p.m., the petitioner signed a confession stating that he had beaten Mullen. It
was 9:45 before the petitioner was taken before a justice of the
peace.
At Staley's trial, the deputy sheriff testified as to the contents of the confession. The petitioner contended that his statement should have been excluded from evidence because of the
unreasonable delay on the part of the State in taking him before
the justice of the peace after his arrest. The court rejected this
claim and held that, pursuant to the recent decision of State v.
Mason266 which discussed circumstances constituting reasonable
Id.
423 U.S. 411 (1976).
264 Id. at 423.
265 253 S.E.2d 66 (W. Va. 1979).
- 249 S.E.2d 793 (W. Va. 1978).
262

263
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delay under West Virginia Code section 62-1-5,B7 the five and
one-half hour delay was reasonable.
However, the court reversed the decision of the trial court
because the judge failed to conduct an in camera hearing on the
voluntariness of the petitioner's confession. Although the court
conducted a short conference with counsel in chambers on the
state of the petitioner's mind at the time he gave the confession,
no witnesses were called, no evidence developing the circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement was introduced,
and the court failed to rule on the voluntariness of the confession.
Thus, following the ruling in State v. Fortner,26the court held
"that it is the mandatory duty of a trial court, whether requested
or not, to hear the evidence and determine in the first instance,
out of the presence of the jury, the voluntariness of an oral or
written confession by an accused person prior to admitting the
failure to observe this procedure consame into evidence, and the
69
stitutes reversible error.

2

Cheryl Lee Davis
James J. Sellitti
Robert Lee Stultz

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
I. EQUITABLE ADOPTION
In Wheeling Dollar Savings and Trust Co. v. Singer, 270 the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recognized the doctrine
of equitable adoption which gives a child who has not been
adopted pursuant to statutory procedures, in some instances, the
same rights and privileges enjoyed by formally adopted chilW. VA. CODE § 62-1-5 (1977 Replacement Vol.) provides in part:
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint, or
any person making an arrest without a warrant for an offense committed
in his presence, shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay
before a justice of the county, in which the arrest is made. ...
268 150 W. Va. 571, 148 S.E.2d 669 (1966).
269 253 S.E.2d at 68 (W. Va. 1979).
270 250 S.E.2d 369 (W. Va. 1978).
267
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The court justified extending the protection of the law to

those who, for all practical purposes, have been adopted but have
not gone through the formal paperwork procedures by pointing to
the circumstances and equities of the child's relationship with his
adoptive parents. The court thus viewed an equitably adopted
child to be as much a family member as a formally adopted child
and held that discrimination against such a child because of his
status was untenable.
In Singer, the appellant, Ada Belle Singer, was taken from
an orphanage at age 8 or 9 by Lyda Wharton. She was given the
name of Wharton, treated like an adopted daughter and represented to the world as being the Whartons' adopted child. She
believed that indeed she had been formally adopted. Lyda Wharton was the beneficiary of a testamentary trust which had been
set up by her aunt in 1923. On Lyda Wharton's death her children were to share in the distribution of the principal of the trust.
Lyda died in 1974 and Ada Belle Singer claimed that, as the
adopted daughter of Lyda Wharton, she should receive the principal of the trust. Lyda had no other children and a guardian ad
litem for the unknown heirs of the aunt challenged Ada Belle
27 2
Singer's claim.

In a declaratory judgment proceeding the Ohio County Circuit Court found that Singer was not the legally adopted daughter of Lyda Wharton since there had been no formal adoption
proceedings. Ada Belle Singer appealed. The West Virginia court
held that formal statutory procedure is not the exclusive method
by which an individual may be accorded the protections of adoptive status.273 The court found that when a child is raised by persons not his or her parents from an age of tender years, treated as
a natural child, represented to others as a natural or adopted
child, and led to rely to his or her detriment upon the existence of
formal paperwork, there is no reasonable distinction between that
child and one who has been formally adopted. The court went on
271 In discussing the policy behind the recognition of this doctrine the court
pointed to its decision in Wheeling Dollar Savings and Trust Co. v. Hanes, 237
S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1977), which permitted adopted children to be treated as natural children in the administration of trusts. Hanes was a major step in improving
the status of formally adopted children.
272
273

250 S.E.2d at 371.
Id. at 373.
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equitably adopted child and the formally adopted child are not
without differences. The formally adopted child need only produce his adoption papers to guarantee his treatment as an
adopted child. The equitably adopted child in any private
property dispute such as the case under consideration involving the laws of inheritance or private trusts must prove by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that he has stood from
an age of tender years274in a position exactly equivalent to a formally adopted child.
The court remanded the case to the circuit court to give the appellant the opportunity to prove the factual basis for her claim of
equitable adoption, specifying that one of the most important elements should be proof that she was held out to all the world as a
natural or adopted child.2 7
II. PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AND DIVORCE DECREES
Outrageous traps for the unwary have been created by the
use and misuse of the terms "ratified", "confirmed", "merged"
and "adopted" in property settlements and divorce decrees. The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' opinion in In re Estate
of Hereford276 is a major step toward clarifying the confusion
caused by these words of art.
In 1957, Frank Hereford divorced his first wife, Quinta Hereford. Prior to the divorce, Mr. Hereford agreed to pay $250 a
month in alimony to Quinta for as long as she lived or until she
remarried. There was no mention, however, of whether the payments would continue upon Mr. Hereford's death. 27 7 The divorce
decree stated only that the prior aggreement was "ratified, approved and confirmed" insofar as it did not conflict with the
other provisions of the decree. In 1975, Frank Hereford died and
the alimony payments stopped. Quinta Hereford was then 70
years old, lacking financial assets, in poor health, and living in a
nursing home. She filed a claim against her former husband's estate which was allowed by the Commissioner of Accounts and the

276

Id.
Id. at 341.
250 S.E.2d 45 (W. Va. 1978).

277

Id. at 48.

274
275
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circuit court over the unsuccessful challenge of the executrix.17 8
In its decision, the court focused both on the equities of
Quinta Hereford's claim and the legal impact of the words of art,
"ratified, approved and confirmed", used in the divorce decree.
Since the law of domestic relations is governed by the traditions
of equity, the court decided that the facts in the case should have
a significant impact on the result. It thus found that "alimony
could be a charge against the deceased former husband's estate
where the present value of the former wife's entitlement to alimony during her natural life was not speculative, there were extenuating equitable considerations militating in favor of continuing alimony after the death of the former husband, and no
hardship was created to other dependents."2 The court then
moved to clear away the confusion of prior case law surrounding
the use of certain words of art in divorce decrees.2 80 Formerly, a
great deal of incomprehensible domestic relations law in West
Virginia hinged upon the technicality of whether a property settlement had been "ratified and confirmed" by a court, in which
case the parties were left to contract remedies for the enforcement of the settlement or, alternatively, whether provisions of a
property settlement were "merged" into the divorce decree. If the
provisions were "merged," they became subject to the continuing
jurisdiction of the court which could extinguish or enlarge rights
to periodic payments initially provided by the property settlement agreement. 81
As a result of the court's decision in Hereford all of these
distinctions have been erased, and in settlements after February
1, 1979, the parties may agree to anything in the property settlement as long as it is approved by the circuit court.2 82 Thus, in the
future, it will be assumed
that any award of periodic payments in a divorce decree is in-

278

Id.

279Id.
280

at 46-47.
Id. at 49 n.1. The court traces the path of previous decisions which engen-

dered the confusion. The cases cited by the court include Miller v. Miller, 114 W.
Va. 600, 172 S.E. 893 (1934), Jennings v. Bank, 116 W. Va. 409, 180 S.E. 772

(1935), Farley v. Farley, 149 W. Va. 352, 141 S.E.2d 63 (1965), Corbin v. Corbin,
206 S.E.2d 898 (W. Va. 1974) and Beard v. Worrell, 212 S.E.2d 598 (W. Va. 1974).
281 Corbin v. Corbin, 206 S.E.2d 898 (W.Va. 1974).
282

250 S.E.2d at 51.
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tended to be judicially decreed alimony unless there is some
explicit, well expressed, clear, plain, and unambiguous provision in either the court approved property settlement agreement or the decree. The question of whether a court shall have
continuing supervision over the amount of an alimony award,
whether the alimony award shall be enforceable by the contempt remedy, or whether alimony at all shall be awarded as
opposed to a lump sum settlement are all fit subjects for negotiation between the parties subject to the overall supervision of
the court. Mature adults with the help of the court and counsel should be permitted to negotiate terms and thereby bind
283

themselves.

In McKinney v. Kingdon284 the court addressed the issue of
whether a circuit court has jurisdiction in a divorce action to
award the wife possession and title to an automobile previously
owned by the husband. The lower court had awarded the wife a
divorce, custody of the children, and possession and ownership of
the family automobile. The husband sought a writ of prohibition
to prohibit enforcement of the divorce decree as to the
automobile.
The court stated that jurisdicton in divorce cases is purely
statutory and West Virginia Code section 48-2-15 permits courts
to deal with the property of the parties when necessary to effectuate orders entered for the welfare of the parties or of their minor
children.2 5 The court pointed to the decision in Murredu v. Murredu, 286 in which the court had awarded the husband custody of
the children, the right to live in the jointly-owned house until the
youngest child achieved majority, and possession of the household
furnishings.
Building on that precedent, the court determined that the
purpose behind granting possession and ownership of the automobile to the wife was to implement the order granting her custody
of the children. Again citing Murredu, the court stated that
the car is necessary to the proper care and custody of the children as for taking to and from the doctor and dentist, or getting their groceries or buying them clothing or any of the other
28 Id. at 52.

84 251 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 1978).
285
286

Id. at 218.
236 S.E.2d 452 (W. Va. 1977).
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multitudinous reasons that one must leave his home to do in
order to care for his family. The topography and rural nature
of West Virginia further necessitates the accessibility of an au287
tomobile to a family with young children.
Tle court limited its holding to automobiles so that the existing raw concernirig the disposal of real property and other personal property would not be affected. 288 -The court also stated
that titular ownership is a necessary corollary of an automobile's
possession and use, and since taking care of taxes, insurance and
licenses is difficult without the title, transfer of title to the wife
2 89
could be ordered by the lower court.

III. CHILD CUSTODY
In Brotherton v. Boothe,290 the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals decided that grandparents do not have a legal
right to visit a grandchild over the objection of the child's parent.
In Boothe, a child whose mother was afflicted with multiple
sclerosis had lived with her grandparents from the age of six
months until she was four years old, when her mother died. Her
father then demanded and received custody from the grandparents after a habeas corpus proceeding. After that, the grandparents" were granted only rare visits with their grandchild, until
finally the father decided that there would be no future visits.
Although the grandparents did not allege that the father was unfit, they did state that their visits were in the best interests of
their granddaughter. The circuit court was unpersuaded and dis29 1
missed their petition seeking visitation rights.
In a case of first impression, the West Virginia court joined
the majority of states which have held that a parent who has legal
custody of his child also has the right to determine when the
child may visit and be visited by the child's grandparents, and
that'a court has no authority to decree visitation rights to grandparents when such rights have not been agreed to by the par-

281

251 S.E.2d at 219.

288

Id.
Id. at 220.

289
2291

250 S.E.2d 36 (W. Va. 1978).

Id. at 36-37.
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ent.29 2 In addition, the court stated that any moral duty there
may be upon a parent to allow such visits is not a proper subject
of judicial enforcement. Consent to visitation by a'non-parent is a
parental right that is premised on the proposition that the parent
has properly performed his parental duties, has not abandoned
the child, and has not forfeited any of his parental rights. '93 Thus
only when it appears that the parent has forfeited his rights in a
manner recognized by law may the court interfere.2 "
In cases in which child custody is an issue, and there is some
question as to -the quality of care that thechild will be receiving,
it is not uncommon for the trial judge to request a home evaluation be undertaken by the local welfare department. Due to the
fact that the welfare department has certain expertise in this area
and the department is mandated by statute to care for those children who are neglected or abused, the judge often gives great
weight to these home evaluations. But this practice is open to
abuse unless the trial judge is diligent in ensuring that this report
is made known to him only through proper evidentiary procedures.
Thus, in Rosier v. Rosier,295 where the custody of an infant

daughter was in dispute, the judge requested and received a report prepared by the local welfare department following an investigation of the background, living conditions, and general circumstances of the parties. This report was not placed into evidence
and the parties had no opportunity to object to its contents nor
question those who prepared the report. It was apparent from the
record, however, that the trial judge based his award of custody
to the father on the welfare investigation report. 296 The mother
appealed and the court held that in divorce proceedings involving
questions of child custody, reports addressed to a judge by public
assistance agencies which have not been admitted into evidence
should not be considered for any purposes, absent the express
consent of the parties.

292
22

97

Id. at 36.
59 AM. JUR. 2d Parentand Child § 17 (1969).

294 250 S.E.2d at 38.
295
296
297

253 S.E.2d 553 (W. Va. 1979).
Id. at 554.
Id.
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This ruling may be interpreted as a warning to trial judges
that child custody hearings are indeed important and that the informality and flexibility of such proceedings should not be allowed to become so lax as to deny to the parties their substantial
rights as to the proper admission and consideration of evidence.
IV.

PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

In 1979 the West Virginia Legislature added an entirely new
article to the Domestic Relations Chapter entitled, "Prevention of
Domestic Violence. '298 This new statute was expressly designed
to prevent continuing abuse of one household or family member
by another member, and to provide temporary and immediate relief for the abused party so that he or she may make rational decisions regarding his or her future.2 9" The kinds of abuse which
the statute seeks to prevent include the intentional or reckless
causing of bodily injury, the use of threats of serious injury to
frighten and intimidate other household members, and the sexual
abuse of those under eighteen.so ° To commence legal action, the
victim, or parent for a child victim, files a petition with the circuit
court or magistrate court, and such court must give the petition
priority over all other civil actions except trials in progress. The
court can then issue any temporary orders it deems necessary to
protect the victim until a full hearing is held. The hearing must
be held within five days and the complainant must prove abuse
by a preponderance of the evidence.3 0 1
Upon a finding of abuse the court may grant such protective
orders as it deems necessary to protect the victim. Such orders
may include enjoining the abuser from committing further abuse,
excluding the abuser from the household, or ordering the abuser
to pay support to the victim for thirty days.30 2 No protective order can exceed thirty days, but it can be renewed. To enforce
these orders the court is given contempt powers and penalties
may be imposed which include imprisonment for up to thirty
days and/or a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars.3 0 3
3" W. VA. CODE

§§ 48-2A-1 to -8 (Cur. Supp. 1979).

211Id. § 48-2A-1.
300 Id. § 48-2A-2.

302 Id. § 48-2A-5.
302 Id. § 48-2A-6.
303 Id. § 48-2A-7.
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This legislation should help curb the incidence of domestic
violence since it provides immediate and substantial relief to the
victim. The enforcement provisions, especially imprisonment,
should strongly deter violation of any protective orders. Unfortunately, due to the complex and highly emotional nature of domestic violence, it is also possible that this legislation could actually
aggravate domestic disputes. One spouse could use the threat of
an abuse petition to intimidate the other, thus making the court
an unwitting partner in domestic discord. As with most other
types of innovative legislation, however, the new Code provisions
can only be objectively evaluated by the deterrant impact generated over the period of application.
Roderick Stephen Lewis
EVIDENCE
I.

CONFESSIONS AND ADMISSIONS OF AN AcCOMPLICE

In State v. Adkins,304 the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals clarified the rule pertaining to the admissibility of the
confessions and admissions of an accomplice at the trial of a coconspirator. Overruling the principle of State v. Price30 and
State v. Bennett,30 6 the court determined the proper rule to be
that the "admission or confession of an accomplice standing
alone, may not be introduced into evidence against another accomplice as an admission against interest. ' 307 However, the court
noted there is no prohibition against testimony by an accomplice
witness implicating the defendant in the crime when the defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine the accomplice or his
testimony and cross-examination is appropriately preserved in
some other manner.
Under the Adkins rule, the key factor in determining admissibility hinges on the prosecution's motive for calling the accomplice. If the testifying accomplice is called for the purpose of giving detailed testimony and not for the purpose of demonstrating
that he has either confessed or pled guilty to participating in the
crime with which the defendant accomplice is charged, then such

3- 253
305114
306203
307 253

S.E.2d 146 (W. Va. 1979).
W. Va. 736, 174 S.E. 518 (1934).
S.E.2d 699 (W. Va. 1974).
S.E.2d at 147 (W. Va. 1979).
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testimony may be permitted. On the other hand, if the accomplice is called solely for the purpose of demonstrating to the jury
that he has confessed or pled guilty, the testimony will be deemed
inadmissible.
II.

ADMISSIBILITY OF UNRELATED CRIMINAL ACTS OF THE
DEFENDANT

The general rule in West Virginia is that the state in a criminal case may not introduce evidence of a substantive offense committed by the defendant which is separate and distinct from the
specific offense charged in the indictment30 8 However, where the
evidencb of the collateral offense satisfies two requirements it
may be admitted for a limited purpose. In State v. Nicholson, 0 9
which reaffirmed prior decisions on the issue,8 10 the court held
that the unrelated criminal act must fall within the exception
that evidence of collateral offenses which are identical to the
crime charged, are near in point in time and tend to show motive
or intent or a system of criminal action on the part of the defendant may be admitted. In addition to coming within the above
exception, there must also be a balancing test to insure the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by the risk that its
inclusion will create substantial danger of undue prejudice to the
defendant. In order to insure the balancing test is met, the trial
court should require the state to disclose in advance, by in-camera hearing, any evidence of collateral crimes it intends to introduce at trial.
Recognizing the possibility of inciting undue prejudice by the
introduction of collateral crimes into evidence, the court also requires a limiting instruction to be given. The court stated "the
jury must be cautioned by proper instructions that such evidence
is not to be considered as establishing guilt of the crime with
which the defendant is charged."8 11 The question now becomnes
whether the instruction must be given sua sponte or by request
only. Although it appears from the language of the opinion that
the instruction must be given whether requested or not, the court

3*8

State v. Moubray, 139 W. Va. 535, 81 S.E.2d 117 (1954).

309252 S.E.2d 894 (W. Va. 1979).
310 State v. Thomas, 203 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1974).
Il 252 S.E.2d at 898 (W. Va. 1979).
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leaves this question open.

III. HEARSAY
In the case of State v. Williams,3 1 2 the court added a new
twist to the admissibility of hearsay under one of its many exceptions. In Williams the trial court excluded the testimony of Steve
Casey on the grounds that it was hearsay. Casey's testimony was
that jailmate Marshall Hayden had told him that he and Kelley
had entered and robbed the Tri-State Carry Out. Casey would
have testified that Haden had not made any mention of the appellant Williams. The court reviewed its prior position which rejected declarations against penal interests as an exception to the
hearsay rule.31 3
Addressing the underlying rationale of the hearsay rule, the
court noted that hearsay evidence is excluded because it is not
considered sufficiently trustworthy. Adopting Rule 804(b)(5) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 314 the court held that "[h]earsay
evidence which is against the penal interest of the extrajudicial
declarant is admissible even though it does not fall within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule if it possesses sufficient in3 15
dicia of reliability to satisfy the court that it is trustworthy.
Based on the Williams decision, simply because an extrajudicial statement falls within an exception to the hearsay rule does
not necessarily compel its admission into evidence. Nor does the
312 249 S.E.2d 752 (W. Va. 1978).
313

State v. Poe, 69 W. Va. 260, 71 S.E. 177 (1911).
R. Evm. 804(b)(5) provides: (b) Hearsay exceptions.-The following

314 FED.

are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(5) Other exceptions.-A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice
will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes
known to the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant.
3,5249 S.E.2d 752, 753 (W. Va. 1978).
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fact that a statement is not within a recognized exception require
its exclusion. The new rule in West Virginia requires an inquiry
into the reliability of the hearsay. Exceptions to the rule are
henceforth only presumed to be reliable.3 16 Thus, if the party opposing the hearsay offers enough evidence to overcome the presumption of reliability the hearsay will be excluded. On the other
hand, hearsay that does not fall within an exception may be introduced into evidence if sufficient proof of reliability is
presented.
Under the Williams decision, the trial judge is given considerable latitude in determining the reliability and trustworthiness
of objectionable hearsay. However, the degree of reliability that
must be proven is different for both the state and the defendant.
The court stated that "the rules of evidence should be applied in
favor of the defendant in consonance with the philosophy of Anglo-American law that it is better to release the guilty than to
punish the innocent.

3 17

Thus, the state has a greater burden of

proving reliability or lack of reliability than the defendant.
IV.

POLYGRAPH

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has recently
decided the issue of the admissibility of polygraph results in evi31 8 the defendant submitted to a polydence. In State v. Frazier,
graph test prior to trial pursuant to a written stipulation. The
stipulation provided that the test results, together with the opinion of the polygraph operator, would be admissible in court either
for or against the defeidant. The polygraph expert was called at
trial by the state and testified that the defendant lied during the
test. After cross-examination, the defense counsel's motion to
strike the expert's testimony was denied.
Rejecting the use of the stipulation as a ground for admissibility, the court held the polygraph results could not be introduced merely to show credibility or as an extrajudicial exculpatory statement. As to the issue of use of test results to establish
credibility, the court noted that the test results would ordinarily
316Id.
317 Id.

at 757.
252 S.E.2d 39 (W. Va. 1979). The double jeopardy aspect of this case is
discussed in the CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE section of this survey.
118
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not be admissible unless the defendant took the witness stand.
The court also noted that a defendant's extrajudicial exculpatory
statements usually cannot be included in evidence inasmuch as
such statements are generally thought to be too self-serving.
Not only did the court reject the stipulation as a ground for
admissibility, but it also discredited the scientific reliability of the
test itself. Although the court acknowledged that the underlying
concept of a polygraph test rests on the scientific principle that it
measures a person's physiological reactions, it did not accept the
premise that the expert plays a neutral role in the interpretation
of the test results. Thus, because of the high degree of interpretive subjectivity on the part of the operator, the court failed to
give polygraph results the same admissibility as those of a scientific test.
James J. Sellitti

PROCEDURE
I.

DISCONTINUANCE BY THE COURT

In Arlan's Department Store of Huntington v. Conaty,3 19 the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed the issue of a
circuit court's power to reinstate a case to its civil docket after
expiration of the statutory time period allowed for reinstatement.
The plaintiff had filed an action to recover damages for false
arrest against Arlan's Department Store in September, 1970. National Detective Bureau, Inc. and Betty Sue Robinson were made
third-party defendants in January, 1971. No further action was
taken until January, 1975, when pursuant to West Virginia Code
section 56-8-9, the suit was dismissed from the active docket for
failure to prosecute.3 20 Two and one-half years later, in September, 1977, the plaintiff petitioned the circuit court to reinstate the
action. Notice was given to the original defendant but not to the
319

253 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1979).

320 W. VA. CODE §

56-8-9 (1966) provides: "Any court in which is pending any

case wherein for more than two years there has been no order but to continue it,
...may, in its discretion, order such case to be struck from its docket; and it
shall thereby be discontinued."
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third-party defendants. After the judge reinstated the case to the
active docket, the defendant sought a writ of prohibition from the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to prevent further prosecution of the case.
Dismissals or discontinuances of civil actions for failure to
prosecute and their reinstatements are controlled by West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).32 1 In Conaty, the court found
that Rule 41(b) had incorporated, without substantive change,
the provisions of West Virginia Code section 56-8-9 and section
56-8-12. These provisions were relevant to any determination of
judicial authority to reinstate a discontinued civil case. Accordingly, the court held that where an action is dismissed under Rule
41(b) for failure to prosecute, and is not reinstated within the
statutory period allowed under West Virginia Code section 56-812,22 the circuit court is without power to reinstate the expired
action unless23the plaintiff can make a showing of fraud, accident,
3
or mistke.
Not only did the court find that the circuit court did not
have jurisdiction over the cause of action, but it also held that the
circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the parties to the action
since the plaintiff had failed to give notice of her reinstatement to
all the parties as required by Rule 5.324
In Conaty, the court adhered to the general rule of Moore v.
Pyles3 25 and held that the circuit court has the power and authority under Rule 41(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure to reinstate an action when the time limit for filing a reinstatement motion has expired, if proper grounds are

231 W. VA. R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides for striking an action from the docket if
no action is taken within two years and for reinstating within three terms of the
court.
322 W. VA. CODE § 56-8-12 (1966) provides: "[a]ny court may, on motion, reinstate on the trial docket of the court any case dismissed ... within three terms
after the order of dismissal shall have been made. .. ."
323 See generally, 24 Am. Jur. 2d Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit §
80 (1966); 27 C.J.S. Dismissal and Nonsuit § 79 (1959).
32, W. VA. R. Civ. P. 5 provides: "[e]very written motion... shall be served
upon each of the parties" except as otherwise provided.
32. 121 W. Va. 537, 5 S.E.2d 445 (1939).
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demonstrated.
II..

ATTACHMENT

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Gee v.
Gibbs326 was asked to decide, on certification from the circuit

court, whether a vested remainder whose situs is in West Virginia
is subject to attachment so as to confer jurisdiction. Gibbs had
executed a note payable to Morris Plan Bank & Trust Company
with the plaintiff Gee gigning as an accomodation maker. When
Gibbs defaulted on the payment, Gee paid the amount due as an
accomodation maker. Gee, a West Virginia resident, then instituted suit -in West Virginia against the non-resident Gibbs, attempting to gain jurisdiction by attachment and garnishment of
Gibb's vested remainder interest in a trust.
The court in deciding the trust was subject to attachment
under West Virginia Code section 38-7-7, 3 27 held that the vested
trust fell under the traditional notions of an "estate." Since the
question was not certified by the trial court, 328 the court did not
decide whether the attachment was constitutional under the
landmark decision of Shaffer v. Heitner32

1

So it remains to be

seen if the attachment under West Virginia Code section 38-7-7
will survive the Shaffer decision.
III.

STANDING

Latimer,33 0

In Shobe v.
the plaintiffs sought a declaratory
judgment to declare a contract between the West Virginia Department of Natural Resources and Dorcas Public Service Commisson illegal, void, and unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not
have standing under the Declaratory Judgment Act.3 31 Plaintiff
253 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 1979).
W. VA. CODE § 38-7-7 (1966) provides: "[e]very attachment issued under
the provisions of this Article may be levied upon any estate, real or personal, of
the defendant named therein . ... "
3'8 Means v. Kidd, 136 W. Va. 514, 67 S.E.2d 740 (1951).
32 433 U.S. 186 (1977). In Shaffer, the Court held the presence of property
alone would not support jurisdiction when it is completely unrelated to the cause
of action.
so 253 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1979).
31 W. VA. CODE § 55-13-1 (1966) provides "[c]ourts of record ... shall have
328

327
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Shobe was the affected riparian land owner, while plaintiff Nester
was a user of the stream and chairman of Trout Unlimited.
The court, in rejecting the requirement of legal rights for
standing to sue, noted that the federal courts had abandoned the
requirement of personal legal interest in Association of Data
Processing Service Organization,Inc. v. Camp."s2 In adopting a
new test for standing, the court quoted Professor Wright's analysis of the Camp case:
(The Court) announced a two-part test for standing. Standing
exists if 'the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has
caused him injury in fact, economic, or otherwise' or if 'the interest sought to be protected by the complaint is arguably
within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question.'333
Jusktice McGraw, writing for the court, stated that environment concerns should not be lost in the theoretical law of standing. He further noted that the legislature has recognized the importance of protecting the natural resources of the state.334 He
pointed out that Shobe's interest existed as a property owner and
that Nestor's "status" as a user of the stream and as an officer in
a non-profit organization devoted to the preservation of a trout
stream showed personal interest. Thus, both Shobe and Nester
had standing to sue.
The court concluded that a person has standing under West
Virginia Code chapter 55, article 13 to obtain a declaration of
rights, status, or legal relations when his significant interests are
affected by governmental action. However, the court stated that
no formula exists for determining the significant interest in close

power to declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further
relief is or could be claimed."
332 397 U.S. 150 (1970).

. 253 S.E.2d at 60 quoting C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal
Courts § 13 (3d ed. 1976).
334E.g., W. VA. CODE

§ 20-2-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.) declaring that the
wildlife of West Virginia shall be protected for the use and enjoyment of all citizens. W. VA. COD § 20-2-3 (1978 Replacement Vol.) provides ownership of fish in
the people of West Virginia.
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cases, but rather it is a question of degree.
IV.

VENUE

Another aspect of Shobe v. Latimer33 5 concerned venue. The
plaintiffs had sought a preliminary and permanent injunction
under the Declaratory Judgment Act to prohibit the defendants
from carrying out the water contract executed between the West
Virginia Department of Natural Resources and Dorcas Public
Service Commisson. Tle Circuit Court of Kanawha County had
dismissed the action on the theory that it did not have venue to
enjoin the act of diverting water in Grant County.
Since the Declaratory Judgment Act does not fix venue, the
court found the general venue statute applied. In an action
against a state officer, venue, under West Virginia Code section
14-2-2, 3 3 lies in Kanawha County Circuit Court or where the

cause of acton takes place. Therefore, the court held that venue
would have been proper in the Kanawha County Circuit Court
even though the land is located in Grant County. In Brent v.
Board of Trustees of Davis and Elkins College,33 7 the court addressed the meaning of the doing business requirement for venue
over foreign corporations in a circuit court. The controlling statute is West Virginia Code section 56-1-1 which provides that a
foreign corporation may be a party to a suit in the circuit court of
any county "wherein it does business".33 8 The statute provides no
guidelines as to the proper interpretation to be given this doing
business requirement, nor were there any previous judicial inter339
pretations clearly defining this provision.

In Brent, a student at Davis and Elkins College was injured
335 253 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1979).
3'8 W. VA. CODE § 14-2-2(a) (1979 Replacement Vol.) provides that any action
against a state officer be brought in Kanawha County Circuit Court. However, W.
VA. CODE § 14-2-2(b) (1979 Replacement Vol.) provides that any proceeding for
injunctive relief involving real property may be brought in the circuit court of the
county where the real estate is located. Therefore, the plaintiffs in Shobe had a
choice where to bring the action.
.13 256 S.E.2d 432 (W. Va. 1979).
3'8 W. VA. CODE § 56-1-1 (1975 Replacement Vol.).
-1 Both parties to the lawsuit evidently cited earlier West Virginia decisions
as being relevant to the venue issue. The court dismissed the applicability of these
cases in a footnote to the opinion. Id. at 433 n.2.
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when a glass test tube exploded during a chemistry lab. She sued
the college, the laboratory supervisor and Corning Glass Works,
the manufacturer of the test tube, in Hancock County circuit
court. Coming was a foreign corporation authorized to do business in West Virginia. The circuit court dismissed Ms. Brent's
complaint on the ground that it lacked venue as to the manufacturer. She appealed.
The controlling issue on appeal was whether Corning could
meet the "wherein it does business" standard set out in West Virginia Code section 56-1-1. Finding no guidance elsewhere, the
court looked to definitions of "doing business" for purposes of jurisdiction. Specifically, the court looked to the definition of "doing business" found in the West Virginia long-arm statute.34 0 Jurisdiction and venue were considered in the opinion to be such
closely related concepts, that the definition of doing business for
determining when jurisdiction attaches was held to be applicable
to the "wherein it does business" provision of the state venue
statute.342'Therefore, in order to determine whether a corporation
W. VA. CODE § 31-1-15 (1975 Replacement Vol.) which provides:
For the purpose of this section, a foreign corporation not authorized to
conduct affairs or do or transact business in this State pursuant to the
provisions of this article shall nevertheless be deemed to be conducting
affairs or doing or transacting business herein (a) if such corporation
makes a contract to be performed, in whole or in part, by any party
thereto, in this State, (b) if such corporation commits a tort in whole or
in part in this State, or (c) if such corporation manufactures, sells, offers
for sale or supplies any product in a defective condition and such product causes injury to any person or property within this State notwithstanding the fict that such corporation had no agents, servants or em-'
ployees or contacts within this State at the time of said injury. The
making of such contract, the committing of such tort or the manufacture
or sale, offer of sale or supply of such defective product as hereinabove
described shall be deemed to be the agreement of such corporation that
any notice or process served upon, or accepted by, the secretary of state
pursuant to the next preceding paragraph of this section in any action
or proceeding against such corporation arising from, or growing out of,
such contract, tort, or manufacture of sale, offer of sale or supply of such
defective product shall be of the same legal force and validity as process
duly served on such corporation in this State.
341 Jurisdiction and venue were compared summarily and, in the court's opinion found to be designed to meet basically the same considerations. The court
noted that "venue restrictions are designed to protect defendants from litigating
in inconvenient forums." 256 S.E.2d at 434. Jurisdictional concepts were described
310
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is doing business within a county for purposes of venue, the court
applied the test that is set out in W. Va. Code section 31-1-15,

which determines jurisdiction.
Finding the record to be inconclusive for purposes of applying the statutory standard, the case was reversed and remanded
to the circuit court in order to
decide if Coming Glass Works has made any contracts to be
performed in whole gr in part, by any party thereto, in Hancock County; if it has committed a tort in whole or in part in
the County; or if it has manufactured, sold, offered for sale or
supplied any product in defective condition and such product
has caused injury to any person or property within Hancock
42

County.3

There is one rather cryptic limitation added to this definition
of doing business for purposes of venue wherein the court held
that, "[t]hese activities must be related to this particular cause
about which the court's venue is questioned."3' 3 Therefore, not
only must the corporation do business in the particular county
wherein venue is sought, but apparently that business activity
must also be related in some way to the cause of action before the

circuit court. This prevents the result seemingly suggested earlier
in the opinion that, "once a corporation is authorized to do business in a state it could be sued in any county. '34' The business
done must have some relation to the cause of action brought in

that county.
V.

GARNISHMENT

The question of the applicability of the West Virginia Rules
of Civil Procedure to a statutory proceeding for the reduction of a
as being centered on considerations of fundamental fairness after the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). In
other words courts are now to examine the relationship between the forum, the
defendant and the controversy for purposes of deciding if a court may exercise
jurisdiction. This inquiry was considered to be so similar to the inquiry into convenience of a particular forum that the logical result was to employ the same elements "upon which jurisdiction may be based to find what doing business is for
venue purposes." Id. at 435.
:42

256 S.E.2d at 435.

843

Id.

34

Id. at 434.
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garnishment was decided by the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals in July of 1979.
The court, in Cottrell v. Public Finance Corp.,3s " decided
that a garnishee's petition to reduce the garnishment against him

was analogous to other statutory proceedings to which the Rules
apply, and held that the Rules apply to proceedings under West
Virginia Code section 46A-2-130(3), which provides generally for
the reduction or removal of an execution upon the earnings of a
"consumer." '46 Statutory proceedings for a reduction in garnishment were held to be "other judicial proceedings" within the
meaning of Rule 1 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.3 4 7 This conclusion was based upon what the court called a
comparison of the proceedings under section 46A-2-130 to other

statutory proceedings to which the Rules apply. Only one example of another proceeding is mentioned in the opinion, that being
West Virginia Code section 38-9-4 which provides an equitable
remedy'for a creditor who claims a debtor has overvalued a homestead exemption. The similarities between the two proceedings
which led the court to a finding that the Rules of Civil Procedure
are applicable were found in that the "two statutes are similar in
regard to the nature of the minimal procedure set forth and in

256 S.E.2d 575 (W. Va. 1979).
§ 46A-2-130 (1976 Replacement Vol.) provides:
No court may make, execute or enforce an order or process in violaton
of this section. Any time after a consumer's earnings have been executed
upon pursuant to article five-A (§ 38-5A-1 et seq.) or aritcle five-B (§ 385B-1 et seq.), chapter thirty-eight of this Code by a creditor resulting
from a consumer credit sale or consumer loan, such consumer may petition any court having jurisdiction of such matter or the circuit court of
the county wherein he resides to reduce or temporarily or permanently
remove such execution upon his earnings on the grounds that such execution causes or will cause undue hardship to him or his family. When
such fact is proved to the satisfaction of such court, it may reduce or
temporarily or permanently remove such execution.
" Rule 1 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
These rules govern the procedure in all trial courts of record in all actions, suits, or other judicial proceedings of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity, and in any appellate review of such
actions, suits, or other judicial proceedings, with the qualifications and
exceptions stated in Rule 81. They shall be construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. (emphasis
added).

34-

311 W. VA. CODE
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regard to the absence of348any other statutory direction in the procedure to be followed.
In holding that the Rules apply, the court went on to reverse
the trial court for its failure to "properly" resolve the question of
the timeliness of the answer, which was timely insofar as the
court's show of cause order to the petition was concerned, but was
not within the time period prescribed by the Rules. 4 9
Finally, the court in dicta outlined the standards to be used
in determining if a case of undue hardship has been shown on a
petition for a reduction in garnishment.35 0 The conceptual framework upon which this unique provision is based is that a person
should have enough money left after the deduction of the garnishment from wages to meet ordinary and necessary expenses
and still have money for unforseen expenses and discretionary
spending.
"[Piarticularity in pleading and proof ' 51 is required and the
court, in a footnote, emphasized the desirability of using prehearing conferences and stipulations to "avoid uselessly lengthy
proceedings and to explore the possibility of settlements."3 52
Circuit courts are to determine what expenses are ordinary
and necessary. Outlining what constitute ordinary and necessary

348

256 S.E.2d at 579.

On appeal, petitioner Cottrell, has raised an issue regarding whether the
trial court had ruled correctly on his objection to the timeliness of the answer filed
by the respondent finance company. Part of the difficulty stemmed from the fact
that the court had, acting ex parte, abated the garnishment pending a hearing on
the same day that Cottrell filed his petition. A hearing was scheduled beyond the
period within which an answer must be filed. Public Finance Corp. filed its answer
at the hearing and on appeal, claimed that by setting the hearing for a date beyond the 30 day period within which answers are to be filed, the trial court had, in
effect, granted an extension pursuant to RuLE 6(b)(1) of the West Virginia Rules
of Civil Procedure. The court did not fully explain how the question of timeliness
of the answer had not been resolved. It simply said: "We hold the trial court erred
in dismissing the petition without properly resolving the issue of Cottrell's objection to the answer's timeliness." 256 S.E.2d at 579.
310 Cottrell, on appeal, claimed that the trial court had ruled contrary to the
clear weight of the evidence and had abused its discretion in holding that he had
failed to prove a case of undue hardship. However, the court declined to review
this question because of the absence of findings of fact on the record. 256 S.E.2d
at 579 (W. Va. 1979).
351 256 S.E.2d at 581.
349

"I2 Id. at 581 n.12.
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expenses, the court refers to standards used in other areas of the
law such as in the field of domestic relations. Accordingly, such
expenses as "family clothing, education or recreation, dwelling,
medical care, transportation ... food . . . tools for the debtor's
trade or business",3 53 as well as expenses pursuant to court orders

and contractual obligations are to be considered in determining
the debtor's ordinary and necessary expenses. The overall standard is one of reasonableness.
The Cottrell decision clearly holds that the Rules apply to
the unique garnishment reduction proceedings provided under
West Virginia Code section 46A-2-130(3) and suggests the kind of
pleading and proof required for a garnishee facing "undue hardship" to escape all or a part of the effect of a garnishment against
him.
VI. CONTEMPT POWERS
Although not raised by the appellants in Floyd v. Watson,85'
the court, sua sponte, examined the propriety of a jail sentence
which had been imposed on the Watsons upon their continued
failure to comply with a lower court's order to construct the wall
55
and to deed over the requisite property in dispute.
The court used a two-step analysis to evaluate the propriety
of imposing a jail sentence for contempt. First of all, the contempt proceedings must be characterized as either civil or criminal. Secondly, if found to be wholly civil in nature, a jail sentence
could only be imposed if the contemnor is given an opportunity to
purge himself of the contempt.
Id. at 580-81.
254 S.E.2d 687 (W. Va. 1979). The contractual aspect of this case is discussed in the, CONTRACTS section of this survey.
35 The Watsons were first cited for contempt upon their failure to comply
with the court order entered in the plaintiffs' second suit. Their request for a jury
trial on the contempt and their potential punishment was denied. After a hearing,
the court found the Watsons guilty of contempt and ordered them to purge themselves by building the wall. A graduated fine was also imposed. A second hearing
was held about 25 days later after which the Watsons were again held in contempt, but this time were fined and sentenced to 70 days in jail. 254 S.E.2d at 689.
For a more detailed background, see the discussion of the case in the CONTRACTS section of this survey.
353
3-
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In Hendershot v. Handlan,sss relied upon in Floyd, the West
Virginia court recognized that no clear line of demarcation exists
between civil and criminal contempt. In some circumstances, the
proceedings may contain characteristics of both civil and criminal
contempt. The West Virginia ourt uses 'the same analysis in
Floyd as that employed by the United $tates Supreme Court in a
1911 decision33 7 to distinguish between civil and criminal contempt. The court must examine the nature of the punishment imposed. If it is primarily designed to vindicate the public authority,
the contempt is criminal. If the punishment is primarily coercive
however, and if it is designed to benefit the complaining party,
the contempt is civil. Applying this analysis to the situation between the Floyds and the Watsons, the court found that the purpose of the contempt was coercive rather than punitive. The purpose of the court's order holding the Watsons to be in contempt
was to provide a remedy to the complaining party.
Once the contempt is characterized as civil, the propriety of a
jail sentence becomes much more suspect. Citing a 1970 Maryland
case, the court said that "the authorities are in almost unanimous
agreement that the imposition of a fixed term of imprisonment
for civil contempt is improper where the contemnor is given no
opportunity to purge himself of the contempt."35 8 Since the punishment for civil contempt should be remedial, it should be
designed to coerce the contemnor into acting in such a manner as
to benefit the complainant. Imposition of a definite jail sentence,
with no opportunity for the contemnor to purge himself of the
contempt, does nothing but punish. For this reason, the court set
aside the jail sentence imposed on the Watsons, affirming the

:" 248 S.E.2d 273 (W. Va. 1978).
57 Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). The West
Virginia court cited generously from this opinion by Justice Lamar. The United
States Supreme Court' held in this case that imprisonment may be ordered for
civil contempt, but only where the imprisonment is intended to be coercive rather
than punitive. Imprisonment is coercive according to Justice Lamar, where the
sentence is indeterminate and the contemnor is simply held until he performs the
act required by court order. The fatal flaw in the imposition of a jail sentence on
the Watsons therefore, was the fact that they were given a determinate sentence
which is punitive and is therefore improper in cases of civil contempt.
358 254 S.E.2d at 692, citing McDaniel v. McDaniel, 256 Md. 684, 689, 262
A.2d 52, 55 (1970).
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lower court's order in every other respect.
Robert Lee Stultz
Sarah G. Sullivan

PROPERTY
I.

COAL, OIL, AND GAS
A.

Leases

In two recent decisions, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals considered attempts by lessors to void leases of mineral
interests.
5
Goodwin v. Wright"
involved an oil and gas lease with a primary term of ten years and an extended term for as long thereafter as oil and gas, or either of them, was produced. The lease further provided that free gas was to be furnished to the lessor for
domestic use and that delay rental was to be paid until a well
yielding royalty to the lessor was drilled. 60 Even though the lessor was furnished with free gas, he sought to have the lease cancelled since he had received no delay rental or royalty for more
than four years. The circuit court held that his acceptance of the
free gas prevented the termination of the .lease.3 61

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was faced with
two threshold questions. First, whether the term "'produced" as
used in oil and gas leases meant "produced in paying quantities 8 6 2 and second, whether furnishing free gas for domestic use
on the premises constituted production sufficient to keep the
lease in force after the primary term.863 As to the first question,
the court noted that it had never upheld an extension of a lease
beyond its basic term, when its continuation was predicated on
lessee development or production activities and there had been
no work on the lease and no substantial production or diligence in

35' 255 S.E.2d 924 (W. Va. 1979).
31' Id. at 925.
361 Id.
362

363

Id.
Id. at 926.
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seeking production.3 6' The court then adopted the majority
rule 6 5 that the term "production", when used in a mineral lease
as the basis for continuation of the lease in force, meant production in paying quantities.386 In response to the second question,
the court held that supplying free gas for domestic use does not
satisfy a duty to produce absent some agreement, or facts that
might bind the lessors by estopping their complaint about lack of
production, and that the use of such free oil or gas does not, in
itself, constitute production that would keep a lease in effect after
3 67
the basic term.
A lease of coal lands was at issue in Iafolla v. Douglas Pocahontas Coal Corp..368 The lease provided, inter alia, that the
lessee anticipated beginning operations on a date certain but was
under no duty to do so and that the lessee agreed to pay a minimum rental of twelve hundred dollars for each lease year, regardless of whether any coal was mined. 69 The lessee made timely
rental payments during the term of the lease, but nevertheless the
lessor sought to terminate the lease since there was a failure to
produce coal.370 The circuit court held, among other things, that
the lessee had abandoned the lease by its failure to mine coal and,
371
therefore, the lease was terminated.
The primary question which faced the court was whether the
lessors of mineral rights under a lease which provided that the

364

Id.

Id. at 925. The court cited Garcia v. King, 139 Tex. 578, 164 S.W.2d 509
(1942), as authority for the majority rule.
366 255 S.E.2d at 924 (Syllabus pt. 1). The court notes that here the lessor
received neither rental nor royalty payments and there was no attempt to produce
and market oil and gas. Two West Virginia cases are then distinguished where
leases were upheld when there was no paying production, but only because of the
fact that both lessors received rental payments as though there was paying production. The court further states that the lease should have been cancelled since a
lessor cannot remain bound to such a lease when it does not pay because the objective of such lease is not merely to have oil or gas flow from the ground but to
obtain production that is commercially profitable to both parties. Id at 926.
67 Id. at 927. The court cites as authority Anderson v. Schaffner, 90 W. Va.
225, 110 S.E. 566 (1922) and Metz v. Doss, 114 IMI.App. 2d 195, 252 N.E.2d 410
(1969).
"

368 250 S.E.2d 128 (W. Va. 1978).

s6g Id. at 130.
370
371

Id. at 131.
Id.
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lessee either exploit the minerals or pay a minimum rental in lieu
of such exploitation may cancel the lease for failure by the lessee
to exploit the minerals. It was held that where the parties have
agreed to a lease in which the lessee has the option to either pay a
minimum rental or exploit the minerals, such a lease is valid and
enforceable in the absence of fraud, mistake, misrepresentation,
or failure of consideration and may not be unilaterally cancelled
by the lessor,3 2 In reaching this decision, the court stated that
there were no cases in West Virginia which held that a lease calling for minimum rental payment in lieu of exploitation could be
abandoned as long as the minimum rental payment was regularly
paid, with one possible exception.7 The court then recognized
that abandonment could be based on an implied covenant to exploit within a reasonable time,3 7 4 but also recognized that such a
covenant could not supersede an express contradictory covenant. 75 The court limited its holding, however, by stating that
there could be a situation where minimum rental payments were
timely made and constructive fraud would arise, thus voiding the
lease.3 7 6 The application of this potential rule would seem to be
confined to a situation where a change in circumstances, unforseeable by the parties, would become so unfair and uneven as to
render the lease's enforcement equivalent to the perpetration of a
fraud upon the lessor.
B.

Partition

In Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. v. Riley,- 7 Consolidated,
the owner of an undivided eleven-twentieths interest and lessee of
all oil and gas underlying certain tracts of land, filed suit against
the individual co-owners of the remaining interests in such oil

Id.
Id. at 131-32. The court distinguishes Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co., 78 W.
Va. 329, 88 S.E. 1075 (1916), on the basis that the lease in that case had different
terms than the lease in question here.
37 The court distinguishes Bluestone Coal Co. v. Bell, 38 W. Va. 297, 18 S.E.
493 (1893), since it did not involve minimum rental payments and reconciles the
same case stating that a reasonable time of seventeen years espoused in Bluestone
372

371

had not elapsed in the case at hand. 250 S.E.2d at 133.
37 An express contradictory covenant was present in the lease. 250 S.E.2d at
134 n.3.
37 250 S.E.2d at 133.
377 247 S.E.2d 712 (W. Va. 1978).
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and gas seeking partition of the mineral interests through sale.
The circuit court, apparently without considering partition 378
in
kind, ordered that the mineral interest be partitioned by sale.
The first question presented to the court on appeal was
whether, as a matter of law, there was an absolute right to partition the oil and gas by sale. The court's discusson focused on two
West Virginia partition statutes.3 79 The court noted that even
though the West Virginia partition statute38 0 was drawn in
mandatory language, it had never interpreted the statutory right
to partition by sale as absolute when partition in kind was not
feasible and further noted that the statutory requirements must
be met before a partition by sale may be authorized. 38' These
statutory requirements compel the party desiring partition
through sale to demonstrate that the property cannot be conveniently partitioned in kind, that the interests of one or more parties will be promoted by the sale, and that the interests of the
other parties will not be prejudiced by the sale. The court held
that there was no absolute right of partition by sale 8 2 but that
383
there was a statutory right to have partition in kind considered.
The second issue in the case was whether a subsisting lease
on a mineral interest was an absolute bar to partition.3 " The
court stated that the case law8 5 suggested that partition of a min-

171 Id. at 713.
W. VA. CODE §§ 37-4-1,-3 (1966). Section 37-4-1 provides:
Tenants in common, joint tenants and coparceners of real property,
including minerals, and lessees of mineral rights other than lessees of

379

oil and gas minerals, shall be compelled to make partition,...

(empha-

sis added).
Section 37-4-3 provides:
[o]r in any case in which partition cannot be conveniently made, if the

interests of one or more of those who are entitled to the subject, or its
proceeds, will be promoted by a sale of the entire subject, or allotment
of part and sale of the residue, and the interest of the other person or

persons so entitled will not be prejudiced thereby, the court . . ., may
order such sale, or such sale and allotment .... (emphasis added).
38o
3l
282

W. VA. CODE § 37-4-1 (1966).

247 S.E.2d at 714.
Id. at 714-15.

3 A majority of jurisdictions hold that oil and gas are real property and may
in appropriate circumstances be partitioned in kind. Id. at 716.
:84

247 S.E.2d at 717.

" Blair v. Dickinson, 133 W. Va. 38, 54 S.E.2d 828 (1949).
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eral interest on which there was a subsisting lease was available
by virtue of statute.8 6 The court espoused the view that it was
not suggesting that there would be no set of facts in a particular
case which would preclude partition of a mineral interest where
there was a subsisting lease, but held that a subsisting8 7lease on a
mineral interest was not an absolute bar to partition.
II. ESTATES, GIFTs

AND TRUSTS

In Kanawha Valley Bank v. Friend,s88 the court extended
the doctrine of constructive fraud to a situation involving joint
bank accounts with the right of survivorship. This case arose
when Dunbar, attorney-in-fact for Judy, transferred some thirty
thousand dollars ($30,000.00) of Judy's money into a joint savings
account, in the name of Judy and Dunbar, with the right of survivorship. This transaction occurred approximately four months
prior to Judy's death. Upon Judy's death, the executor filed a declaratory judgment action to determine the ownership of the
funds in the accounts. The circuit court helds 9 that Dunbar
owned the money by virtue of the survivorship provisions of the
West Virginia Code.38 0 The beneficiaries under Judy's will appealed contending that the circuit court ignored the presumption
of constructive fraud.38 1
The court had previously interpreted the statute authorizing
joint bank accounts with the right of survivorship in Dorsey v.
Short.3 92 In that case, the court held that joint bank accounts
with the right of survivorship created a conclusive presumption of
a causa mortis gift at the death of the donor-depositor in the absence of fraud, mistake, or other equally serious fault.393 The
question for the court in Friend then became whether construc-

388

W. VA. CODE § 37-4-7 (1966). Section 37-4-7 provides:

Any person who, before the partition or sale, was lessee of any of
the lands divided or sold, shall hold the same of him to whom such land
is allotted or sold, on the same terms on which, by his lease, he held it
before the partition.
"7 247 S.E.2d at 717.
388 253 S.E.2d 528 (W. Va. 1979).
38

Id. at 529.

W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33 (1975 Replacement Vol.).
391 253 S.E.2d at 529.
380
392
393

205 S.E.2d 687 (W. Va. 1974).
253 S.E.2d at 529-30.
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tive fraud existed so as to vitiate the presumption of a causa mor-

tis gift under Dorsey. In its decision, the court stated that a
power of attorney created an agency which established a fiduciary
relationship between the principal and agent. The court cited the
standard of conduct for an agent which had been outlined in
Sutherland v. Guthrie.394 In that case the court stated that an
agent was held to the utmost good faith, and would not be allowed to use the principal's property for his own advantage, or to
derive secret profits or advantages to himself by reason of the
principal-agent relationship. Thus, in Friend the court stated
that a presumption of fraud would arise where the fiduciary was
shown to have obtained any benefit from the fiduciary relationship and that the burden of proof would 5be on the fiduciary to
3
establish the honesty of the transaction.

1

Finally, the court held that it would join the majority of jurisdictions which hold that in certain instances a presumption of
constructive fraud may arise in connection with joint bank accounts with suvivorship, if the parties to the joint account occupy
a fiduciary or confidential relationship. 9 This presumption requires that the person who benefits from the creation of the account bear the burden of proving that the funds were, in fact, a
bona fide gift. In reversing the lower court and remanding this
case, the court stated that the fiduciary had not met the burden
of proof which the court suggests is something more than a mere
3 97
preponderance of the evidence.

III.

EMINENT DOMAIN

Cook,39 s

In Handley v.
a landowner brought an action in prohibition challenging an order which granted a power company a
right of entry over his lands for construction of a high voltage
power line to serve a single coal mining operation. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals issued a rule to show cause on
two specific questions. First, whether supplying electricity to a
single mining operation was a public use under the laws of the
3' 86 W. Va. 208, 103 S.E. 298 (1920).
"1 253 S.E.2d at 530-31.
390 Id. at 531.
397

Id. at 531-32.

398 252 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1979). This case is also discussed in Comment, 82
W. VA. L. REv. 357 (1979).
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State of West Virginia, and second, whether an order which
granted a right of entry for construction of a power line was appealable notwithstanding the fact that construction had not begun and compensation had not been determined.3
In analyzing the first question, the court stated that it was
apparent that the power company had the power of eminent domain for construction of power transmission lines. Then, the
court reviewed the cases most analogous to Handley and found
that when dealing with gas and power lines they had, without exception, found a public use present. 00 In holding that condemnation of private property to erect an electric power transmission
line to a single commercial customer was a public use, the court
noted that it would not distinguish between residential and commercial users and would give paramount consideration to the nature of the use rather than the number of persons served.40 1 As to
the second question, the court stated that it was clear that the
circuit court had jurisdiction in condemnation proceedings and
that unless it so exceeded its legitimate powers as to vitiate that
jurisdiction, prohibition was not the proper remedy. 02 In finding
that the circuit court had acted properly, the court held that in a
condemnation proceeding the order adjudicating the right to take
was a final order and upon the order's issuance, the landowner
could apply for a writ of error and supersedeas .4 0 Finally, the
court overruled all language in prior cases that implied that the
land must actually be taken into possession and use or compensa404
tion actually determined before a writ of error would lie. '
Justice McGraw's dissent in Handley centered on his contention that the majority failed to take an important issue into account in making its decision. Apparently he felt that the power
company failed to get Public Service Commission approval for its
line and as a result the circuit court should have dismissed the
899 Id.
400

Id. at 148. The court did not imply that anything for which a power or gas

company seeks to condemn private property will be considered a public use, but
only that condemnation of rights-of-way to provide energy have been cosidered by
the court as serving a public use. Id. at 148-49.
401
402

403
404

Id. at 147, 149.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 149.
Id.
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condemnation proceedings. 05 Thus, Justice McGraw opined that
the circuit court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
controversy, that an action in prohibition was proper, and that to
turn down such 0an
action was a denial of due process of law to
6
4

the landowners.

West Virginia Board of Regents v. Fairmont Morgantown
Pittsburgh Railroad Co. 4 07 was a case of first impression in West
Virginia. 408 The Regents brought an eminent domain proceeding

to condemn an aerial easement and certain surface rights-of-way
for construction of a personal rapid transit system, better known
as PRT, to serve West Virginia University. This easement was
parallel to the railroads' tracks for a linear distance of four-fifths
of a mile. The circuit court. rendered judgment in a nominal
amount for the railroads and they appealed. The salient question
before the court was the determination of the proper measure of
damages in a case of this nature.
After a brief citation of authority, the court decided that the
railroads were entitled to more than nominal damages and that
they had an absolute right to a determination of the amount of
damages by a properly instructed jury.40 9 It was felt that there
were three aspects to the railroads, damages: first, the value of
the land taken for the use of the PRT; second, the value of the
aerial easement over the railroads' right-of-way; and, third, the
damage to the residue
of the railroads' right-of-way as used for
0
railroad purposes.

41

The court, following the weight of general authority, noted
that railroads were not limited to the fair market value of land
along rights-of-way measured by the price per square foot of comparable property in the same neighborhood used for private purposes as were normal landowners. 411 As to the first aspect of damId. at 150.
Id. at 151.
407 250 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1978).
408 Justice Neely states, "[W]e do not routinely construct systems of electric
powered, rubber tired, computer controlled cars operating on elevated guideways."
Id. at 142.
409 250 S.E.2d at 142-43.
410 Id. at 143.
411 According to the weight of authority, special rules for railroads are a result
405
406

of the favored position which railroads are accorded in the United States. Also,
since this land is for a special limited purpose, it is not commonly bought and sold
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ages, the court held that the measure was the fair market value of
the property taken for the special purpose of a railroad right-ofway. Further, the court held that the value of the aerial easement
was the fair market value of the aerial easement for railroad
right-of-way purposes. Finally, as to the third aspect of damages,
the court held that the railroad could recover the cost of required
safety devices, safety devices not required if such devices were
actually employed in like circumstances by a majority of United
increase in its insurance premiums as a
States railroads, and the412
result of the added risk.
IV.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

41
In Rogers v. City of South Charleston,' the West Virginia

court construed statutes granting power to city board of park and
recreation commissioners. The board granted a private individual
an irrevocable and exclusive option to purchase a tract of land
located in a municipal recreation area, and Rogers commenced an
acton for injunctive relief. The circuit court found that the option
of the board and was
granted was beyond the statutory authority
41
4
appealed.
board
The
void.
therefore
The court was faced with the question of whether the board
1
was clothed with the statutory authority to grant the option.4 5 In
in the market and as a result has no market value for general purposes. Id. at 144.
412 250 S.E.2d at 145. This case grew out of a situation where the railroad
right-of-way was taken for the construction of a parallel or intersecting facility by
another public utility. As a result, the court limited its decision to condemned
railroad rights-of-way. Note that this unique rule would not apply to other railroad property which could be freely exchanged in the market place.
4-- 256 S.E.2d 557 (W. Va. 1979).
414

Id. at 559-60.

W. VA. CODE §§ 8-21-1 to -2 (1976 Replacement Vol.). Section 8-21-1
provides:
Every city is hereby empowered and authorized . .. to create by
ordinance, a board of park and recreation commissioners, for the purpose of establishing, constructing, improving, extending, developing,
maintaining and operating a city public park and recreation system.
Section 8-21-2 provides:
The board of park and recreation commissioners. . . shall have the
power to purchase, hold, sell and convey real or personal property; receive any gift, grant, donation, bequest or devise; sue and be sued; contract and be contracted with; and do any and all things and acts which
may be necessary, appropriate, convenient or incidental to carry out and
415
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analyzing the question, the court stated that it was clear that the
board did not have the power to contract or to convey property to
the same extent as a private corporation since it was limited by
its statutory purpose"'6 and by its character as a public corporation and a trustee. 4 27 It was also noted that the statutes provided
no express grant of authority for the board to enter int6 option
agreements. 41 8 Therefore the court held that the board exceeded
its statutory authority by giving a private or special interest, exclusive, irrevocable rights to purchase in the future real property
held for park and recreation purposes and that such an option
49
agreement was void.
Justice Neely, in a strong dissent, concluded that the statutes
granted the board authority to contract and make option agreements since there were no express limitations on the right to convey property, nor any express requirements which mandated sale
at public auction. 42 0 Justice Neely felt that the majority had indicated a certain indifference to the economic needs of West Virginia, a certain ignorance of basic business practices, and a callous
disregard of an urgent public policy to create employment.421 Justice Neely opined that the majority had used the legal process to
frustrate legitimate economic development and that they had ignored the real issue of whether the contract itself was
effectuate the purposes and provisions of this article...
256 S.E.2d at 560-61.
47 Id. at 561.
41 Id. The court felt that there were two reasons for this: first, the option
effectively tied the hands of future governing bodies in exercising the full jurisdiction of their office by depriving them of a discretion which public policy demands
remain unimpaired and was therefore beyond the authority of the board; second,
the board is a public trustee holding the power to sell and lease property but not
to grant options to purchase since trustees should exercise their judgment at the
time of the sale and not at the time of making the option as to whether the sale is
beneficial to the trust estate. Id. at 562-63.
419 Id. at 563. The court also held that in absence of express statutory author416

ization regarding manner of sale, a board of park and recreation commissioners,
being a public corporation, walks in the shadow of the city and any sale or conveyance of such property to a private or special interest must be accomplished by

means of a public auction held upon proper notice. Id. at 557.
420 Id. at 566.
421

Id. at 568. The land in question was the proposed site for a large shopping

mall.
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reasonable.2 2
Stephens v. Raleigh County Board of Education423 presented
the court with the problem of construing a statute which provided
in general terms for the means by which a county board of education could dispose of property. The court was specifically concerned with a provision which gave the grantor of the property,
his heirs or assigns, the right to repurchase that property if it was
located in a rural community.'2 ' The consolidated cases involved
small tracts of land which were located near incorporated towns
and residential subdivisions. Thus, the sole issue presented to the
court pertained to the definition
of the term "rural community"
425
as used in the statute.

In its deliberations, the court examined its opinion in Carper
v. Cook,'42 in which it termed the provision a concession of the
law to those living in farming communities, so that a small portion of the farm would not be taken for school purposes and then
be allowed to pass into the hands of a stranger to the damage of
the residue of the land.427 The court noted that areas which had
been subdivided or prepared for development or lot sale, incorporated cities, towns, and villages, and other built-up incorporated
areas which would qualify for incorporation in terms of absolute
population and population density could not be considered as ru422 Id. at 567, 569. The test Justice Neely proposed was whether the contract,
at the time of its execution, was apparently fair, just, and reasonable and was
prompted by the necessities of the situation or in its nature was advantageous to
the municipality.
42 257 S.E.2d 175 (W. Va. 1979).
424 W. VA. CODE § 18-5-7 (1977 Replacement Vol.) which provides:
If at any time the board shall ascertain that any building or any
land no longer shall be needed for school purposes, the board may sell,
dismantle, remove or relocate any such buildings and sell the land on
which they are located, at public auction, after proper notice, and on
such terms as it orders, to the highest responsible bidder. But in rural
communities the grantor of lands, his heirs or assigns, shall have the
right to purchase at the sale, the land, exclusive of the buildings
thereon, and the mineral rights, at the same price for which it was originally sold.... (emphasis added).
425 257 S.E.2d at 177-78.
42 39 W. Va. 346, 19 S.E. 379 (1894).
42 257 S.E.2d at 179. The thrust of the repurchase privilege statute was to
protect farm interests and interests associated with rural estates; that is, the preservation of "home places" and operative agricultural units. Id.
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ral communities. 42s Finally, in Stephens, the court stated that the
guiding criterion would be the predominating character of the
community as a whole and held that a rural community could be
distinguished by its dominant character as a social and economic
unit founded in rural, land-based interests. It was further suggested that a rural community was inhabited, in the main, by
country people, who lived a country life, engaged in country pursuits, were removed from the immediacy of urban and suburban
environs, were not immediately tied to any city or urban area,
and worked, socialized and politicked as an independent, integral
community.42 9
V.

AD VALOREM TAXATION

The West Virginia Supreme Court, of Appeals reaffirmed its
willingness to construe tax statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing authority in Consolidation Coal Co.
v. Krupica.430 On February 1, 1979, pursuant to statutory authority, the County Commission of Marshall County convened its session as a board of equalization and review. 431 The commisson assembled at 10:00 a.m. and received three taxpayer objections.
After receiving no more objections, the commission, at 3:35 p.m.,
entered an order foreclosing all other objections. At 3:45 p.m.,

118 Id. The court notes that the difficult decision will be in distinguishing rural from predominately suburban communities. It states that suburbs are a component part of the urban community and cannot, by definition, be a rural
community.
'11 Id. at 180. The court further opined that the question of whether any
given community was rural would best be left to jury determination. Id. at 177
n.2.
430 254 S.E.2d 813 (W. Va. 1979).
4-1 W. VA. CODE § 11-3-24 (1974 Replacement Vol.) (amended 1979). Section
11-3-24, prior to the 1979 Amendment, provided:
The county court shall annually, not later than the first day of February, meet for the purpose of reviewing and equalizing the assessment
made by the assessor. It shall not adjourn for longer than three days at a
time until this work is completed, and shall not remain in session for a
longer period than twenty-eight days . ..
If any person fails to apply for relief at this meeting, he shall have
waived his right to ask for correction in his assessment list for the current year, and shall not thereafter be permitted to question the correctness of his list as finally fixed by the county court, except on appeal to
the circuit court ....
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Consolidation appeared to file its objection, but the commission
was not in session. Consolidation filed a written objection with
the county clerk but the commission deemed it untimely."2
Thereupon, Consolidation sought a writ of mandamus. The sole
question before the court was whether the foreclosure of the objection was valid under the West Virginia statute 83 which governs
the procedure of review and equalization before county
commissions.
This was a question of first impression, as the court did not
find any direct holding on what constituted a timely filing. 43 ' In

construing the tax statute in favor of the taxpayer and against the
taxing authority, the court held that the West Virginia statute
permitted the taxpayer a reasonable time from the opening of the
county commission's term as a board of review and equalization
to file an objection to the property tax assessment. 43 5 Yet the

court declined to set the outer boundaries of what would be a
reasonable time period for the filing of an objection to a tax assessment and stated, "[o]bviously legislative clarification would
be beneficial in this area....
As a result of Krupica the legislature amended the West Virginia Code. The statute now provides:
The county commisson shall annually, not later than the
first day of February, meet for the purpose of reviewing and
equalizing the assessment made by the assessor. It shall not
adjourn for longer than three days at a time until this work is
completed, and shall not remain in session for a longer period
than twenty-eight days and shall not adjourn sine die before

the fifteenth day of February ....

47

Thus, it is exceedingly clear from the amended statute that the
taxpayer has fifteen days, commencing on the first day of February, within which to file his objection and that the county commission cannot adjourn and foreclose all other objections until after the fifteen day period has expired.
4a 254 S.E.2d at 815.
4U W. VA. CODE § 11-3-24 (1974 Replacement Vol.) (amended 1979).
434 254 S.E.2d at 815.
435 Id. at 818.
411 Id. at 818 n.7.
417 W. VA. CODE § 11-3-24 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
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Blair v. Freeburn Coal Corp.4 8 involved a situation where
Carmack acquired a coal tipple via various mesne transfers by bill
of sale. The assessor assessed the tipple as real property and the
taxes went delinquent. The real estate was forfeited to the state
and the Deputy Commissioner of Forfeited and Delinquent Lands
sold the tipple to Blair. Subsequently, Carmack leased the tipple
to Freeburn and Blair leased it to Winner. When Winner attempted to take possession, it encountered Freeburn who was already in possession of the coal tipple. Freeburn filed a motion for
summary judgment on the ground that the coal tipple was personal property and the sale by the Deputy Commissioner was
4 89
void. The circuit court held for Freeburn and Blair appealed.
The sole question presented to the court was whether Blair
acquired a valid title to the tipple through the deed from the
Deputy Commissioner. In analyzing the problem, the court stated
that the legislature provided that only real property was to be
assessed on the land books. The court then recognized the fact
that since the tipple had been transferred by bill of sale on several occasions, it was clearly considered by all concerned to be
personal property and was never intended to become part of the
realty. 440 Therefore, it was suggested that the tippel was a chattel
real which should not have been entered in the real property
books.4 4 1 Finally, the court held that the assessor should have entered the tippel on the personal property books, that his real
property assessment was unlawful, and that such assessment was
basis for the sale of the tipple
void and could constitute no valid
442
by the Deputy Commissioner.
Timothy B. Butcher

TORTS
During the past year, the West Virginia Supreme Court of

438

''
440

253 S.E.2d 547 (W. Va. 1979).

Id. at 550.

Id. at 551.

Id. at 552. The court states that the determination of whether a fixture
becomes part of the real estate to which it is affixed is based on the intention of
the parties.
411

442

Id.
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Appeals answered three questions in the tort law area which have
long been the subject of discussion and speculation. The questions concerned the statute of limitations for libel actions, the
developing doctrines in the area of product liability law, and the
debate over comparative versus contributory negligence. The answers to the questions held some surprises, as the court applied a
one-year statute of limitations to libel actions, adopted a products
liability standard similiar to the California Greenman rule, and
established a fifty percent comparative negligence rule for West
Virginia.
I.

STATUTE OF LIMITATION FOR LIBEL ACTIONS

The court, in a per curiam opinion, announced in Cavendish
v. Moffitt" 3 that "libel is a form of defamation which... is lim-

ited by the one-year limitation period established in West Virginia Code, 55-2-12(c)." 44 4 Cavendish concerned an appeal from a

circuit court's dismissal of a libel action brought against a writer
for the West Virginia Daily News concerning an article published
on February 10, 1975. The basis for the dismissal was that the
libel suit was barred by a one-year statute of limitations, as the
complaint was filed on March 3, 1976, one year and twenty-one
days after the cause of action accrued.
The court reasoned that since no specific limitation for libel
actions are established by any section of the West Virginia Code,
such actions are governed by the provisions of West Virginia
Code section 55-2-12."45 This statute provides specific limitations
upon personal actions for damage to real and personal property
and for personal injuries, while providing a one-year limitation
for all other personal actions which do not survive at common

44

253 S.E.2d 558 (W. Va. 1979).
at 559.
W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (1966) which provides:

414Id.
445

Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought: (a) Within two years next after the right to
bring the same shall have accrued, if it be for damages to property; (b)
within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have ac-

crued if it be for damages for personal injuries; and (c) within one year
next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for any
other matter of such nature that, in case a party die, it could not have
been brought at common law by or against his personal representative.
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law. The court held that section 55-2-12 must be read 446 in pari
materia with West Virginia Code section 55-7-8a 4 Section 55-78a(a) provides that actions for fraud and deceit are personal actions which survive the death of an injured party or the death of
the person liable. The court reasoned that since the Legislature
isolated fraud and deceit as personal actions which do survive,
"the Legislature intended to exclude from statutory survivability
under subsection a (of West Virginia Code §55-7-8a) such personal torts as defamation, false arrest and imprisonment, and malicious prosecution."' 4 48 Personal actions lacking such statutory

survivability, and having no common law survivability, had been
held to take the one-year statute of limitations under West Virginia Code section 55-2-12(c) in Snodgrass v. Sisson's Mobile
Home Sales, Inc.4 9 Thus, the court affirmed the rationale of

Snodgrass in upholding the lower court's dismissal of the action,
thereby adopting a one-year statute of limitation for libel actions
in West Virginia.
II. PRODUCTS LABIITY

In Morningstar v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Company,'450 the West Virginia court had its first opportunity to accept a question of law certified to it under the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act. 5 1 In this case, the United States
416

Snodgrass v. Sisson's Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 244 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va.

1978).

447W.

VA. CODE § 55-7-8a (1966) which provides in part:
(a) In addition to the causes of action which survive at common law,
causes of action for injuries to property, real or personal, or injuries to

the person and not resulting in death, or for deceit or fraud, also shall
survive; and such actions may be brought notwithstanding the death of

the person entitled to recover or the death of the person liable.
253 S.E.2d at 559.
449244 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va. 1978).
450 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979). This case is analyzed and discussed in
41

Rowe, Applying Strict Liability to Defective Products Litigation in West Vir-

ginia with Explanatory Emphasis Upon Coal Mining Machinery Cases, 82 W.
Va. L. Rev. 13 (1979).
4"1W. VA. CODE §§ 51-1A-1 to -12. The uniform Certification of Questions of
Law Act, adopted in 1976, provides that the West Virginia Supreme Court may
answer certified questions of law involved in proceedings before the United States
Supreme Court, United States Circuit Courts of Appeal or Federal District Courts
or the highest or intermediate appellate court of any other state so long as such
questions may be determinative of the cause pending before the certifying court,
and it appears to such court that there is no controlling precedent in the decisions

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1980

95

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 20

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia sought
clarification of the West Virginia law governing the extent to
which a manufacturer of a defective product is liable in tort to a
person injured by that product. The district court had pending
before it a personal injury action brought against the Black &
Decker Manufacturing Company for personal injuries and loss of
consortium allegedly caused by the failure of the safety guard on
a power saw manufactured by the defendant. The West Virginia
court seized upon this opportunity to bring West Virginia into the
majority of jurisdictions recognizing "strict liability in tort" in
product liability cases. Prior to the court's discussion of product
liability tort law, however, attention was focused on the court's
ability to change the common law in light of article VIII, section
13 of the West Virginia
Constitution and section 2-1-1 of the
4 52
West Virginia Code.

Justice Thomas B. Miller, writing for a unanimous court,
concluded that the West Virginia Constitution and Code did not
prevent the court from changing the common law. 5 3 Instead, the
court found that article VIII, section 13 and section 2-1-1 were
intended to establish the initial body of law under which West
Virginia courts were-to operate. This conclusion was based upon
the "lack of consistency on the part of this Court in its treatment
of West Virginia Code, § 2-1-1 and Article VIII, Section 13 of our
Constitution,"'4 5 and decisions of other jurisdictions faced with

similar statutory or constitutional prohibitions. The court also determined that this adoption of the common law by constitutional

of the West Virginia Supreme Court. It was held in Morningstarthat the power to
answer these questions is discretionary with the court, and that in answering such

questions the court must determine the present law bearing on the certified issue.
253 S.E.2d at 669. W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 13 reads: "Except as otherwise provided in this article, such parts of the common law, and of the laws of this State as
are in force on the effe9tive date of this article and are not repugnant thereto,
shall be and continue the law of this State until altered or repealed by the
legislature."
452 W. VA. CODE § 2-1-1 (1979 Replacement Vol.) states: "The common law of
England, so far as it is not repugnant to the principles of the Constitution of this
State, shall continue in force within the same, except in those respects wherein it
was altered by the general assembly of Virginia before the twentieth day of June,
eighteen hundred and sixty-three, or has been, or shall be, altered by the legislature of this State."
"5

44

253 S.E.2d 666.
Id. at 671.
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and statutory provisions included the adoption of the "historic
power" of courts "to evolve and alter the common law."" 55

In its discussion of the decisions of other jurisdictions, the

court failed to mention a 1971 Utah decision456 in which the Utah
Supreme Court pointed to a section of the Utah code' 57 similar to
section 2-1-1 of the West Virginia Code when it refused to abrogate the common law doctrine of contributory negligence. It is
also interesting to note that the court's conclusion that its past
treatment of article VIII, section 13 and section 2-1-1 of the Code
had been inconsistent is based upon a rather limited discussion of
relevant cases which offer arguments against the court's authority
to alter the common law as it existed in 1863.458
After disposing of the issue surrounding the authority of the
court to change the common law adopted by the West Virginia
Constitution and Code, the court turned its attention to strict lia-

bility in tort. The court stated "the cause of action covered by the
term 'strict liability in tort' is designed to relieve the plaintiff
from proving that the manufacturer was negligent in some particular fashion during the manufacturing process and to permit
proof of the defective condition of the product as the principal
basis of liability. '459 The court stated that the issue before it was
whether or to what extent a third party, lacking privity of con-

Id. at 676.
Bridges v. Union Pac. R.R., 26 Utah 2d 281, 488 P.2d 738 (1971).
457 UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-1 (1970) which provides that, "The common law
of England so far as it is not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or the constitution or laws of this state, and so far only
as it is consistent with and adapted to the natural and physical conditions of this
state and the necessities or the people hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the
rule of decision in all courts of this state."
48 Cases cited by the court as authority against the power to change the common law contain such decisive statements concerning this issue as: "[t]his court
...is sternly and unmistakably enjoined to leave drastic changes in the common
law to the legislative branch of government." Cunningham v. County Court of
Wood County, 148 W. Va. 303, 308, 134 S.E.2d 725, 728 (1964); and "these provisions (article VIII, § 13 and § 2-1-1) make it clear that only the Legislature has
the power to change" the common law adopted by these provisions. State v. Arbogast, 133 W. Va. 672, 675, 57 S.E.2d 715, 717 (1950). In Adkins v. St. Francis
Hospital of Charleston, 149 W. Va. 705, 143 S.E.2d 154 (1965), the court justified
the abrogation of the doctrine of charitable immunity by pointing out that the
doctrine was not the common law rule of England or Virginia on June 20, 1863.
45 253 S.E.2d at 677.
401
411
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tract with the seller or manufacturer of a defective product, could
recover in tort for personal injuries caused by such a product.6 0
The court went on to adopt the Greenman41 rule permitting
recovery in a tort product liability action where it is proven that a
defective product causes personal injury. The Restatement
rule,' 62 which requires a showing that the defective condition was
unreasonably dangerous, was expressly rejected, as was the doc46
trine of Rylands v. Fletcher,'
which declares that conditions or
activities inherently dangerous result in liability for injuries without a showing of negligence or defective condition. The general
test for establishing strict liability in a tort product liability suit
in this state now requires a plaintiff to establish that the ifivolved
product was defective,'46 4 "in the sense that it [was] not reasonably safe for its intended use.' 65 "Reasonable safeness" is a standard determined "by what a reasonably prudent manufacturer's
standards should have been at the time the product was made.'

66

An "intended use" of a product is "all those uses which a reasonably prudent person might make of the product, having in mind
4 0 Id. at 676.
4" Greenman v.

Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
462 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965).
4- L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). The West Virginia Supreme Court refused to im-

pose upon the manufacturer of a product the role of an insurer which is created by
the absolute liability resulting from applicaton of the Rylands doctrine.
4"The court recognized three categories of product defects: design defectiveness; structural defectiveness; and use defectiveness. The first two are concerned
with the physical condition of the product rendering it unsafe for reasonable, intended uses, while the third category focuses on unsafeness due to the lack of, or
inadequacy of warnings, labels and instructions. 253 S.E.2d at 682. "Unsafe" was
held by the court to impart a standard of testing the product by what a reasonably prudent manufacturer would achieve regarding product safety, taking into
consideration the "general state of the art of the manufacturing process, including
design, labels and warnings, as it relates to economic costs, at the time the produce was made." Id. at 683.
465 253 S.E.2d at 683.
" Id. The court states that this rule is applicable in suits against both the
manufacturer and the seller in a case involving a product which is expected to and
does reach the consumer in a condition substantially the same as when it was sold.
The court further noted that in most jurisdictions a seller who has not contributed
to the defect has an implied indemnity remedy against the manufacturer when the
injured user sues the seller.
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its characteristics, warnings and labels.

467

The defense of abnormal use is still available to the defendant in a product liability case.4 6 8 The assumption of the risk defense is available in those cases where it is shown that the plaintiff continued to use the product subsequent to his gaining
"actual knowledge" and "full appreciation of the defective condition.' 4 9 The court said that contributory negligence was available
as a defense when it consisted of more than a failure to discover
or guard against the possibility of the defect. But, since the supreme court has subsequently abandoned the defense of contributory negligence in favor of the doctrine of comparative negligence, 47 0 there is some question as to the effect of comparative
negligence upon product liability law and the cases brought thereunder. A judicial decision or statutory enactment will be required
to determine whether the doctrine of comparative negligence is
applicable in product liability suits, and if so, how this doctrine is
to be applied.7 1
II.

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

In Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co.47 2 the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals abrogated the defense of contributory
negligence, and replaced it with the doctrine of comparative negligence. Bradley concerned the appeal of two cases in which the
plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought comparative negligence instructions in order to avoid the defense of contributory negligence.

467

Id.

468 Id. Abnormal use, in light of the definition given to "intended use" by the

court, includes those uses which a reasonably prudent person would not make of
the product, having in mind its characteristics, warnings, and labels. For a good

discussion of abnormal use and other defenses in product liability suits, see, Noel,
Defective Products:Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of
Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93 (1972).
469253 S.E.2d at 683.
470Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979), discussed in the next segment of this section.
471 See V. SCHWARTZ, ComPARATivE NEGLIGENCE (1974), particularly Chapter
12 for a good discussion of strict liability and comparative negligence.
472 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979). For a more detailed analysis of the ramifications of this decision see Symposium on Bradley v. Appalashian Power
Co.--West Virginia Adopts Comparative Negligence, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 473
(1979).
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Justice Miller, again writing for a unanimous court, concluded
that adoption of the fifty percent approach to comparative negligence in West Virginia would overcome the harshness of the contributory negligence defense and avoid the potential injustices involved in applying the pure comparative 'negligence model.
The court quickly disposed of the issue of authority to
change the common law in light of article VIII, section 13 of the
West Virginia Constitution and West Virginia Code section 2-11,473 by pointing to the recent decision in Morningstarv. Black &
Decker Manufacturing Company.474 The remainder of the opinion is devoted to a discussion of why contributory negligence
should be abandoned, why the fifty percent model of comparative
negligence is favored over the pure concept, how to apply the fifty
percent model, and, finally, a discussion of the decision's
retroactivity.
The defense of contributory negligence, strictly applied by
juries, barred a plaintiff from recovery if it was found that his
47 5
negligence "contributed in the slightest degree" to the accident.
The court labeled this rule as an "anomaly" in our system of jurisprudence based on "concepts of justice and fair play," since it
"excuses the defendant from the consequences of all of his negligence, however great it may be.' 4 70 In order to absolve the harshness which results from applicaton of the contributory negligence
defense, the court adopted a rule which allows a party to recover
damages in a tort action so long as his negligence or fault, which
proximately contributed to the accident, does not equal or exceed
77
the combined negligence or fault of the other parties involved.
This approach was favored over the pure comparative negligence
model which allows a plaintiff to recocer regardless of the degree
of his negligence, so long as his award is reduced in proportion to
his contributory negligence. The court, in Bradley, acknowledged
that most commentators and those jurisdictions which have judicially adopted comparative negligence have criticized the fifty
percent rule, primarily on the ground that it involves the establishment of an arbitrary line beyond which contributory negli,"'See notes 451-452, supra.
474 See text accompanying notes 450-58, supra.
475 Crum v. Ward, 146 W. Va. 421, 122 S.E.2d 18, Syl. Pt. 7 (1961).
476 256 S.E.2d at 882.
477Id. at 879.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol82/iss3/20

100

et al.: Survey of Developments in West Virginia Law: 1979

1980]

SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS

8
gence still bars plaintiff's recovery. 47

In declining to adopt the pure comparative negligence rule,
the court said that it was unwilling "to abandon the concept that
where a party substantially contributes to his own damages, he
47 9
should not be permitted to recover for any part of them.
Adoption of the pure comparative negligence model would result
in such an outcome, according to the court. "The practical result
of such a system is that it favors the party who has incurred the
480
most damages regardless of his amount of fault or negligence,
and thus would be a "radical change in our present fault-based
tort system.""81 To demonstrate this result, the court offers the
following hypothetical: Plaintiff, having insurance coverage totalling $50,000.00 is involved in an accident resulting in $20,000.00
damage to him and $800,000.00 to the defendant. If plaintiff is
found to be ten percent at fault and defendant guilty of ninety
percent of the fault proximately causing the accident, plaintiff's
recovery is $18,000.00 and defendant's award is $80,000.00 under
the pure comparative negligence system. Offsetting plaintiff's liability to defendant by his $50,000.00 insurance coverage and his
$18,000.00 recovery still leaves him with a potential $12,000.00
uninsured exposure.4 82 Such a result would discourage plaintiffs
from bringing damage suits, a result not favored by the court.
The possibility of such an occurence, combined with the contention that juries would likely conclude a plaintiff should be denied
recovery whenever his negligence approached the fifty percent
level, 483 were offered by the court to counter the criticism that the
fifty percent rule represents an arbitrary line drawing lottery. It
must be noted that the comparative negligence rule will not be
applicable to situations involving an intentional tort. In such a
case, the "plaintiff would recover his damages undiminished by
any contributory negligence."'48' Nor does adoption of comparative negligence alter basic West Virginia law concerning joint

478

Id.

479

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

490
481
482
483
484

885.
883.
887.
883.

Id. at 883 n.12.
Id. at 887.
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tortfeasors. 85 The court does state that the common law principles of joint and several liability are preserved, but there are
other questions concerning multiple parties in a fifty percent system which are not answered by Bradley.'8 These questions concern the following:
1) Whether plaintiff's negligence is to be compared with the
negligence of 487
all defendants in the aggregate or each defendant
individually?
2) How will indemnity and contribution be handled?
3) How will awards be apportioned when multiple plaintiffs
are involved?
4) What affect, if any, does the negligence of unjoined
tortfeasors have?
5) How will counterclaims by defendants guilty of less than
fifty percent of the negligence be handled?
Application of the comparative negligence doctrine requires
the jury to state, by general verdict, the total amount of damages
each party is entitled to recover. Then, by special interrogatory,
the jury must apportion the percentage of fault or contributory
negligence attributable to each party. It is the trial court's duty to
calculate the net amount of each party's award by deducting from
each gross award the party's percentage of fault. 88
The rule of Bradley, adopting comparative negligence in
West Virginia, is fully retroactive, 89 and thus will apply in all
cases pending at the time of the decision. "Retroactivity of an
overruling decision is designed to provide equality of application
to the overruling decision because its new rule has been consciously designed to correct a flawed area of the law.'4 90 The
court held that the following factors are to be considered in determining whether or not to make an overruling decision retroactive.
485256

S.E.2d 879.
See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974), particularly § 3.5(c)
and Chapter 16 for a good discussion of multiple parties in comparative nbgligence
486

cases. See also, C. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL (1978).

48 It would appear that Bradley answers this question where it states that
"[a] party is not barred from recovering damages ... so long as his negligence or

fault does not equal or exceed the combined negligence or fault of the other par-

ties involved in the accident." 256 S.E.2 at 885.
4"
469
4"

Id.

Id. See also Sullivan v. Billey, 256 S.E.2d 591 (W. Va. 1979).
256 S.E.2d at 880, Syll. pt. 4.
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First, retroactivity is less justified when the substantive issue
overruled involves a traditionally settled area of the law as opposed to a dynamic area, and the new rule was not clearly foreshadowed. Second, retroactivity is more readily accorded decisions concerning procedural rather than substantive law. Third,
since common law decisions usually involve fewer parties and
have a narrow impact, they are more likely to be granted retroactivity. Fourth, prospective application is favored when decisions
represent a clear departure from prior precedent and where substantial public issues arising from statutory or constitutional interpretations are involved. Fifth, greater limitations should be
placed upon new decisions which result in a radical departure
from the previous substantive law. Sixth, other jurisdictions
retroacshould be examined to determine their treatment of the
49 1
tive/prospective question in the same area of the law.
Allen R. Prunty

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
In the case of Mitchell v. State Workmen's Compensation
Commission,92 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was
presented with a number of complex and important issues. The
claimant, Roger Mitchell, sustained a lower back injury on May
26, 1976, in the course of and resulting from his employment and
he had begun receiving treatment from a physician on the same
day. On July 14, 1976, the Commissioner awarded Mitchell temporary total disability benefits. Later that summer the doctor informed the Commissioner that, as of August 30, 1976, the claimant had reached a maximum degree of improvement. Mitchell
requested that he be sent to another doctor and the Commissioner then sent him to a different physician who started Mitchell
43
on a therapy program.
On November 2, 1976, the employer protested the continuation of temporary total disability benefits and urged the Commissioner to terminate benefits as of August 30, 1976, since on that
491 Id. at 880, Syll. pt. 5.
492

256 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1979).

493 Id.
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day the original treating physician stated that Mitchell had
reached a maximum degree of improvement. With the claim
under protest, the Commissioner continued to pay Mitchell temporary total disability benefits. On September 26, 1977, over a
year after the injury, the second physician released Mitchell from
treatment to return to work. The last hearing on the employer's
protest was held in January, 1978, and the Commissioner terminated the claimant's benefits as of August 30, 1976, and the Ap94
peals Board affirmed.4

The basic issues presented in this case were: 1) the extent of
the Commissioner's authority to permit an employer to protest
the continuation of temporary total disability benefits when a
timely protest was not made to the original award under West
Virginia Code section 23-5-1; 2) the limits of the Commissioner's
authority to terminate temporary total disability benefits without
according the parties an evidentiary hearing; and 3) the effect of
the 1976 amendments to West Virginia Code section 23-4-1c regarding overpayments of temporary totaf disability benefits.
The court held that the employer's protest should not have
been considered under West Virginia Code section 23-5-1 since it
was filed beyond the 30 day period prescribed in the statute.4 5
Under section 23-5-1 the Commissioner is empowered to make an
initial award without a prior evidentiary hearing. Only if this
award is challenged within the 30 day period does the right to a
hearing apply. This type of protest is really a challenge as to
whether the*claimant meets the statutory eligibility requirements,

I" Id. at 5.
41 W. VA. CODE § 23-5-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.) provides in part:
The commissioner shall have full power and authority to hear and
determine all questions within his jurisdiction, but upon the making or
refusing to make any award, or upon the making of any modification or
change with respect to former findings or orders, as provided by section
sixteen [§ 23-4-16], article four of this chapter, the commissioner shall
give notice, in writing, to the employer, employee, claimant or depen-

dent, as the case may be, of his action, which notice shall state the time
allowed for filing an objection to such finding, and such action of the
commissioner shall be final unless the employer, employee, claimant or
dependent shall, within thirty days after the receipt of such notice, ob-

ject, in writing, to such finding. Upon receipt of such objection the commissioner shall, within fifteen days from receipt thereof, set a time and
place for the hearing of evidence. . ..
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thus invoking the Commissioner's jurisdiction to make an
award.49 Here, the protest was made over three months after the
Commissioner's initial award.
The second method of protesting the continuation of temporary total disability benefits is where the employer obtains new
medical evidence that the claimant has reached maximum degree
of improvement or is certified to return to work.4 97 There is no
time limit on this type of challenge, nor is there a requirement
that a hearing be held' before termination since the decision is
based on new medical information transmitted to the Commissioner and on evidence contained in the claimant's file. But in
such a protest under West Virginia Code section 23-5-1c, the
Commissioner is required to49 8notify the claimant that a discontinuation has been requested.

Although the Commissioner can terminate benefits without a
hearing under section 23-5-1c, there are certain minimal due process procedures which must be followed. 499 In Mathews v. El-

dridge500 the United States Supreme Court set forth a balancing
test for procedural due process in the termination of disability
benefits. Generally this test involves the individual's right to receive the government-created benefit versus the government's
right to establish standards for the accurate and efficient administration of such benefits. In the instant case, unlike Mathews,
the third party interest of the employer was considered and the
fact that the benefits could only last for a maximum of 208 weeks
was distinguishable from Mathews where the benefits were for
life.85 1
49

256 S.E.2d at 8.

497

Id.

498 W. VA. CODE § 23-5-1c (1978 Replacement Vol.) provides:

In any case wherein an employer makes application in writing for a
modification of any award previously made to an employee of said employer, and such application discloses cause for a further adjustment
thereof, the commissioner shall, after due notice to the employee, make
such modifications or changes with respect to former findings or orders
in such form as may be justified, and any party dissatisfied with any
such modification or change so made by the commissioner, shall upon
proper and timely objection, be entitled to a hearing as provided in section one [§23-5-1] of this article.
499 256 S.E.2d at 9.
509 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

501 256 S.E.2d at 10.
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The Supreme Court of Appeals held that, in light of Mathews, the procedural due process rights due the claimant in the
face of a challenge to the continuation of temporary total disability benefits under section 23-5-1c are: 1) prior written notice to
the claimant of the reasons for considering termination; 2) the
right of the claimant to submit for consideration on his behalf
any countervailing medical evidence; and 3) the claimant's statutory right to an evidentiary hearing under section 23-5-1, upon
timely protest to an adverse order.502 But if the claimant has actually returned to work, he will be held to have voluntarily terminated his rights to tenporary total disability benefits and the
Commissioner is then not required to send him a prior notice of
503
termination.
As to the third issue, the court felt that the Commissioner
had misunderstood and misinterpreted the law as to overpayments. A protest of an initial award of temporary total disability
benefitd under section 23-5-1 is really directed at the Commissioner's jurisdictional foundation for the award, i.e., whether the
claimant met the statutory requirements. If the employer prevails
in his protest, it means that the claimant was not lawfully entitled to the benefits and he must repay them.'" But where the
initial award is not challenged, and instead only the continuation
of such award is subsequently contested, the claimant will be
deemed to have lawfully received the initial benefits.
Under such a protest, the Commissioner can terminate the
benefits when the claimaht has reached maximum degree of improvement, but he cannot find an overpayment. The initial award
is lawful up until the time that the Commissioner orders discontinuation.505 It is the Commissioner and not the doctor who
makes the ultimate factual determination as to the degree of disability based on medical information contained in the claimant's
file. The date of his order is the date of his decision; he cannot
adopt the date of a particular physical examination, which means
he cannot terminate the benefits retroactively.50 6

502

Id.

503

Id.

504

Id. at 12.

5o Id. at 13.
508 Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol82/iss3/20

106

et al.: Survey of Developments in West Virginia Law: 1979
19801

SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS

The specific relief given in Mitchell was that the hearing
under West Virginia Code section 23-5-1 was not proper since the
protest was filed more than 30 days after the initial award and
therefore the results of that hearing were invalid. Since the second physician treated the claimant until September 26, 1977, and
the claimant apparently returned to work on that date, the Commissioner should have terminated benefits as of that date. Therefore, the Commissioner's ruling of February, 1978 and the Appeal
507
Board's affirmation were overturned.
The Mitchell decision is important because it clearly delineates the procedural rights of employee-claimants when there is a
protest to the continuation of temporary total disability benefits.
The court's ruling "recognizes that once the government establishes a program distributing benefits, it must employ certain basic procedures to ensure that the operation of the system does not
undermine the human dignity and self-respect of persons who
seek those benefits." 508 The case is also significant in that it clarifies the application of the statute as to overpayments, so as not to
overburden claimants, who in most instances are in no financial
condition to repay any benefits received.
In Hagy v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,50 9 the West Virginia court touched upon some of the same
issues as in Mitchell5 10 and used the Mitchell case for guidance.
In Hagy, the claimant's widow appealed an order which denied
her an award for permanent partial disability benefits and which
retroactively terminated her husband's temporary total disability
benefits as of April 1, 1976. The claimant was awarded temporary
total disability benefits for broken fingers which resulted in atrophy of his forearm and biceps. On April 1, 1976, the treating physician stated that the claimant had reached a maximum degree of
recovery. There was no award of permanent partial disability
benefits, although the doctor recommended that he be evaluated
for such benefits. The claimant died in a non-work related accident on May'll, 1977. On October 20, 1977, the Commissioner
entered an order terminating temporary total disability benefits

Id. at 14.
508 Id.
509 255 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1979).
507

510 256 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1979).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1980

107

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 20

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

as of April 1, 1976.
As to the permanent partial disability benefits, the court held
that a dependent can only receive the balance of such an award
when such an award has been ordered during the worker's lifetime. After death there is no way to make a medical evaluation of
the injury.
Thus, in Hagy, as in Mitchell, the protest to the temporary
total disability benefits concerned the continuation of the benefits
and not the initial award. Therefore, following the principles announced in Mitchell, the date of termination for purposes of any
overpayment was the date of the Commissioner's order and not
the date of some prior physical examination. In Mitchell it was
the claimant's return to work that automatically terminated benefits. Here, it was the claimant's death that terminated benefits.
Therefore, the Commissioner should have terminated the temporary total disability benefits as of May 11, 1977, the date of death,
and not as of April 1, 1976.511
In Wnek v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,512 the court again demonstrated the application of Mitchell. In this case the claimant received a back injury on October 4,
1977 and was awarded temporary total disability benefits. On
April 3, 1978, the employer protested the continuation of the benefits. In September of 1978, the Commissioner referred the claimant to a Dr. Hughes, and before receiving a report from the physician but after a hearing on the protest the Commissioner
terminated the temporary total disability benefits on October 2,
1978 retroactive to July 17, 1978. Pending the results of a myelogram ordered by Dr. Hughes, the claimant's temporary total
disability benefits were reinstated from December 11, 1978 to
February 5, 1979, and these benefits were not in dispute.
On March 20, 1979, the claimant sought mandamus for temporary total disability payments from July 17, 1978 through December 11, 1978 and from February 5, 1979 to March 23, 1979. On
March 23, 1979, the Commissioner awarded the claimant a ten
percent permanent partial disability and denied any payments as

51 255 S.E.2d at 911.
512 256 S.E.2d 772 (W. Va. 1979).
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sought in the mandamus

1

The court held that the claimant had no absolute right to
have temporary total disability benefits continue from the time of
injury until a permanent partial disability award was made. As
the court said in Mitchell, in a proceeding under West Virginia
Code section 23-5-1c, where an employer protests the continuation of benefits, the Commissioner can on his own initiative terminate benefits when credible evidence is present in the claimant's file that he has reached maximum degree of improvement or
is certified to return to work. Since there was nothing in the statute that required the Commissioner to act on this point, mandamus would not lie.51'
As to the Commissioner's order of October 2, 1978, retroactively terminating benefits as of July 17, 1978, in Mitchell the
court had held that the proper date of termination is the date of
the Commissioner's order. Therefore, the Commissioner had a
nondiscretionary duty to terminate the benefits as of October 2,
1978, and mandamus was granted to require the Commissioner to
award the claimant temporary total disability benefits from July
17, 1978 to October 2, 1978.515
There had been no case in West Virginia where the court had
specifically held that an employee can become totally and permanently disabled as a result of multiple hernias. This changed with
the decision of Pertee v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner.5 18 In this case, the claimant sought total and permanent disability benefits by virtue of the combined effects of six
inguinal hernias. The claimant was 39 years old, had a grade
school education and had a work history of only heavy physical
labor. He had received so many operations that the muscles were
very weak, there was much pain and swelling, and he had pain
when moving his legs. Lay witnesses said tht his normal activities
were limited, that he limped and that sometimes he had to be
assisted in placing his legs into a car. The doctors that treated the
claimant reported that although the most recent hernia was
somewhat repaired, the muscle and tissue were so weak that even

513

Id. at 773.

514 Id. at 774.
515 Id.
016 255 S.E.2d 914 (W. Va. 1979).
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normal activity could cause it to reoccur, and that, therefore, he
should do no more heavy physical labor.5 17
The court held that as a result of six recurrent inguinal hernias, the claimant was unable to engage in substantial gainful activity requiring skills or abilities comparable to those of any gainful activity in which he had previously engaged with some
regularity over a substantial period of time, and therefore a permanent total disability existed.""
In Boggs v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,19 the court addressed the problem of a second injury
award under West Virginia Code section 23-9-4b. In 1974, Boggs
was granted a fifty percent permanent partial disability for occupational pneumoconiosis. Shortly thereafter he requested that his
case be reopened for progressive or aggravation to consider the
combined effects of a prior disability together with his occupational pneumoconiosis.
In 1948, Boggs had contracted tuberculosis and as part of the
then-recognized appropriate treatment, his lung was medically
collapsed as a form of therapy. This caused impairment of lung
capacity and the residual effects along with the occupational
pneumoconiosis rendered the claimant totally disabled. Boggs did
not claim compensation for the tuberculosis, but he claimed that
the collapsed lung was a traumatic event with residual effects and
that he should qualify for a "second injury" award under section
52 0
23-9-4b.

The court held that the collapsed lung was not an injury by
accident as required by statute, and that the injury could not be
attributed to a definite, isolated, fortuitous occurrence. 52 1 The
collapsed lung, the court stated, should be considered in the context of the situation in which it occurred, i.e. in relation to the
tuberculosis, and that since the tuberculosis was not compensable
the claimant was not eligible for a total disability award, but only
for such disability as was attributable to the occupational
51

Id. at 917.

518 Id. at 918. See Posey v. SWCC, 201 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 1973).
515

256 S.E.2d 890 (W. Va. 1979).

12' Id. at 892.
5"21Adams v. G.C.

Murphy Co., 115 W. Va. 122, 174 S.E. 794 (1934).
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pneumoconiosis.5"
The question was also raised as to the scope of inquiry once a
case has been reopened. The court held that once a reopening has
been granted under West Virginia Code section 23-5-1a, any
party has the right to contest the modification and to develop
fully any issues regarding a progression or aggravation of the
claimant's condition or to develop any other facts which were not
previously considered by the Commissioner in his original
52 3
findings.
Roderick Stephen Lewis

522 256 S.E.2d at 893.
823

Harper v. SWCC, 234 S.E.2d 779, 783 (W. Va. 1977).
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